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INTRODUCTION

Commenting upon a scholarly paper is considerably easier
if the paper presents obvious flaws or points of disagreement.
Owing to the modern scholarly tradition, in law and other
disciplines, of severely criticizing or even "trashing" the work
upon which one is to comment, I had hoped to have the opportunity to pounce upon the principal paper in this Symposium.
Unfortunately, Rochelle Dreyfuss's excellent assessment prevents me from riding the critical wave of the modern ethos.
Much of her analysis is unassailable.1
Nonetheless, I will attempt to raise at least a few countervailing views on the issue of specialized business courts. In
addition, rather than simply praising Professor Dreyfuss, I will
take the opportunity to build on her thorough analysis of the
issue and raise some additional questions about specialized
dispute resolution, both in business disputes and other contexts. I particularly want to further explore some of the generic

' I found myself facing essentially the same situation at the 1994 Annual

Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. At a Civil Procedure Section
program on the new Federal Rules regarding discovery, Professor Dreyfuss presented with her usual thoroughness and insight a paper on amended Rules 26-37,
leaving me essentially no room to contradict her. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The
What and Why of the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L. REV. 9 (1994); Jeffrey W.

Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin's New-Old Procedure as
a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem," 46 FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994). See
generally Symposium, Recent Changes in the Rules of Pretrial Fact Development:
What Do they Disclose About Litigation and the Legal Profession?, 46 FLA. L. REV.
1 (1994). As the foregoing citations indicate, however, the elegance of Professor
Dreyfuss's work neither stopped me from commenting nor made me particularly
succinct.
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issues of judicial specialization that she mentioned as only a

minor element in her discussion of the Delaware Chancery
experience and her view of its unlikely repetition for commercial law in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.
At the outset, some clarification of terminology is necessary. Judge Pauline Newman's Federal Circuit colleague, S.
Jay Plager, for example, has criticized commentators for using
the term "specialized" court too loosely' and ignoring the dis-

tinction between specialized subject matter and specialized
judges.' What, then, is the meaning of specialization? Traditionally, specialization means specialized subject matter; for
example, a court has jurisdiction, usually exclusive jurisdiction,
in a single area of law.4 According to Prof. Dreyfuss,
"[s]pecialized courts usually are defined as forums of highly
limited jurisdiction to which all of the cases of a particular
type are channeled."'
Specialization thus traditionally is seen as a combination

of "the extent to which particular kinds of cases dominate a
2 S.Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and
the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39
Am U. L. REV. 853, 863 (1990).
Professor Revesz begins his article with a statement that "[tlhere are ...
two Article II courts staffed by full-time specialized judges: the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade."
Building on that erroneous perception, Professor Revesz goes on to construct a theoretical matrix on the basis of which he then analyzes the
desirability of vesting the review of administrative action in specialized
courts with specialized judges (predictably he finds it undesirable), and
gives his assessment of the relative merits of different types of such specialized courts.
Id. (citing Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990)).
Judge Plager's assessment is a bit misleading and unfair to Professor Revesz
in that it both quibbles unnecessarily with the choice of terminology and because
the Revesz position against specialized courts does not hinge upon the precise
degree to which judges are "specialized." Rather, Revesz seems to oppose any appellate system where judges are assigned exclusive review of discreet categories of
cases. See Revesz, supra, at 1165.
' Plager, supra note 2, at 863. I should add, however, that Judge Plagers
pique over nomenclature cannot be attributed to mere curmudgeonliness. He in
fact praises Professor Dreyfuss for observing the distinction in her examination of
the Federal Circuit.
' See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
r Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts
in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (emphasis added).
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court's work, and the extent to which particular kinds of cases
are concentrated in a single court" 6 with "the narrowness of a
court's work [seen as] the more significant of the two dimensions."7 But, as Judge Plager points out, "it does not follow
that if a court specializes in one or more areas of the law, the
judges appointed to the court should be specialists in those
areas."8 In discussing specialization, I shall endeavor to use
the term to mean restricted and concentrated jurisdiction, even
where the concentration is not exclusive or all-encompassing.9
I also will use the term as something of a catchall for tribunals
that are in some way more focused in their mission, procedure
or personnel than are the courts we normally refer to as
generalist.
Definitional caveats aside, Professor Dreyfuss's paper
prompts a number of responses. First, in the interest of at
least pretending to be a tough critic, I want to raise just a
little skepticism about the efficacy of the Delaware Chancery
Court and Delaware corporate law. Although Professor
Dreyfuss's endorsement of the Chancery experience generally
is convincing, her presentation suggests a litigation nirvana
that seems to good to be true-and therefore probably is.
Second, I want to discuss specialized adjudication from the
perspective of the "sociology of the profession." In particular, I
want to focus on whether wider adoption of specialized adjudication, in corporate or other contexts, will prompt improvement
or diminution in the quality of our judges and their decisions.
The issue of court organization is related to overall judicial
quality-effective specialization may alter the entire adjudica-

Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts
to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 127, 218 (1991) (citing Lawrence Baum,
Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 823, 826-27 (1977)).
7 Id.

Plager, supra note 2, at 858.
It bears re-emphasizing as well that, according to the traditional definition
of specialization (exclusive, highly specialized jurisdictional focus), few of the courts
we commonly regard as specialized are in fact specialized. Consequently, in the
interests of brevity and pragmatism, I will, like Prof. Dreyfuss and others before
me, refer to the Delaware Chancery Court and the Federal Circuit as specialist
courts when they might more accurately be described as semi-specialized courts.
Although I do not wish to take issue with Judge Plager at this point, it seems to
me that specialization of subject matter frequently and perhaps inevitably leads to
some greater specialization of judicial function.
'
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tion system in which the specialized tribunal operates. Finally,
lest we forget, the profession includes practitioners, as well as
judges and academicians, whose quality must be considered in
evaluating the costs and benefits of specialized tribunals. 0
Third, I want to place today's analysis of the Delaware
Chancery Court and Professor Dreyfuss' work regarding the
Federal Circuit within the general literature of specialized
courts. The academic literature has been largely pessimistic
about specialized tribunals, and Professor Dreyfuss has agreed
with much of it." However, in her specific examinations of
two specialized courts-Delaware Chancery and the Federal
Circuit-she gives both institutions high marks. Her findings
suggest both that the naysaying about specialization probably
is overstated and that specialized adjudication looks better up
close than it does from afar. Perhaps theoretical negativism
about specialization is not only overstated but outright wrong
in some important ways.
Finally, I want to propose that future federal specialized
adjudication efforts be constructed like specialized Article I
trial tribunals, reviewable by general jurisdiction Article IT
appellate courts. Existing literature (as supplemented by Professor Dreyfuss's thoughtful paper) suggests that this is
emerging as the theoretically optimal mode of specialization,
albeit with the caveat that every situation is context-specific.
This model must be carefully targeted, however, and used only
for substantive areas of law that are highly likely to react well
to specialized court adjudication.
Notwithstanding these caveats, it appears that state
courts, although not locked into the same constitutional system
as the federal judiciary, could profit from imitating this hybrid
model for certain sorts of high volume, patternized litigation
that is relatively more susceptible to objective, politically neutral analysis. In addition, both Professor Dreyfuss's work presented today and her earlier study of the Federal Circuit sug-

10 Professor Dreyfuss does not make this oversight. She considers the role of
the corporate bar on Delaware courts and law. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 3940.
n On the whole, however, I would characterize Dreyfuss as a moderate proponent of specialization, or at least someone who favors additional cautious experimentation with specialization. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Spccialized Adjudication,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 439-41.
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gest that complete and narrow specialization does not work as
well as what might be termed "semi-specialization."
I. RAISING ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DREYFUSS
ANALYSIS OF DELAWARE
A. Whither Goeth the CorporateRace?
Professor Dreyfuss adopts what might be termed the more
conservative and deferential view of the efficacy of Delaware
corporate law in her paper and her presentation. 2 This approach generally views the market as making a statement with
which one should not lightly quarrel. Because Delaware continues to attract incorporations, this view posits that the state's
attraction is the superiority of its corporate law compared to
other states, which lack a semi-specialized Chancery Court.
Consequently, in a race to the top of corporate standards, legal
rules and adjudications, Delaware's success in the market
suggests that Delaware's legal product is good.3
Other respected commentators, however, view corporate
law standards as a "race to the bottom" in which states scramble over one another to impose the fewest obligations upon
corporate management in an attempt to keep and attract
incorporations that will bring valued tax revenue to the jurisdiction."
At one point near the end of her paper Dreyfuss acknowl-

12 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 2, 29.
13 See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 2

(citing Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation
Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 919-20 (1982)); see also Roberta A. Romano, Law as
a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
225, 280 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977). My primary expertise involves civil procedure and litigation generally and I claim no sophisticated
assessment of corporate law theory or practice. Consequently, I neither endorse
nor reject what might be termed the Winter-Romano-Fischel hypothesis of a corporate law race to the top.
14 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992);
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism:
State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Stan.
dards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759 (1987).
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edges these conflicting views.' Within a few lines, however,
she implies that the reader need not worry about the
naysayers and should accept the "race to the top" construct. 6
For example, Dreyfuss cites Judge Ralph Winter,"7 Judge
Frank Easterbrook, 8 and Professor Daniel Fishel"9 for the
proposition that the market indeed forces managers to
prioritize shareholders' best interests, even to the point of
lobbying the Delaware legislature aggressively on their behalf.
Although this trio of prominent legal thinkers may be right,
invoking their names as conclusive proof sounds a bit like
citing Ronald Reagan, Dan Quayle and Phil Gramm for the
proposition that any type of national health care initiative is
doomed to failure.
It appears to me that this issue continues to be a debate
rather than a settled question." Perhaps I have been too long
in the academy, where the intellectual rage is philosophical
pragmatism, skepticism, and the contingency of knowledge, (a
fad sufficiently powerful that it has enraptured even prominent conservatives such as Seventh Circuit Judge Richard
Posner).2 Nonetheless, I have the uneasy feeling that it is too
early in the day to deem the debate ended and declare the
race-to-the-top school the clear, final and inevitable winner.
B. IncorporationBehavior:A Flawed Yardstick?
Related to that debate is the concern over the accuracy of
using incorporation as the measure of the success of

16

Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 40-41.
Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 29-32.

"

Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 22, (citing Wmter, supra note 13, at 251).

IS

Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 22, (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Dis-

15

cretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Euidence, 9 DEL J. CORP. L. 540
(1984)).
9 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 22, (citing Fischel, supra note 13, at 913); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel . Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 JL.
& ECON. 395 (1983).
20 It
does appear that the race to the top theorists are winning. This may
result from the inexorable ascent of the better viewpoint. It also may stem from

the bully pulpit of power that this side of the debate enjoyed during the 19803
through federal executive and judicial appointments or because faith in (even reverence for) markets is now ideologically in vogue.
" See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
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Delaware's specialization court. For example, one can argue
with some force that incorporation decisions do not necessarily
reflect infatuation with the state's law of corporate governance.
The incorporation decision, particularly the decision to stay,
may be influenced more by tax rates, the degree of regulator
scrutiny history, inertia or other favorable factors only loosely
related to the state's judicial structure. Dreyfuss herself invokes the example of the Delaware legislature's responsiveness
to corporate law problems. In particular, she refers to the Su22 which repreme Court's 1977 decision, Shaffer v. Heitner,
jected a plaintiff shareholder's attempt to obtain personal jurisdiction over the directors of Delaware corporations through "attaching" the corporate ledger in Delaware and forcing the defendants to come to the state to defend their "property."23 As
Dreyfuss notes, the legislature quickly passed a law providing
that the director of a Delaware-chartered corporation constructively had consented to suit in Delaware.2 4 Although the Delaware legislature may indeed appeal to investment capital, the
Delaware judiciary does not necessarily have similar attractiveness.
In addition, the legislative response may be less pro-shareholder than Dreyfuss portrays it. The legislative response to
Shaffer, for example, may have been prompted more by a
feared decline in litigation-related revenue for the state economy than by any consideration of dissident shareholders' rights.
The legislative reform may even have been the product of the
brute lobbying force of the state's corporate bar.25 Dreyfuss's
description, however, puts a most positive spin on this
event.21 Of course, she may be positing correctly that a legis-

- 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
'

Id. at 192.

24 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 23 n.73 (citing DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 10 § 3114

(Supp. 1990)).
' Dreyfuss points out that the Delaware corporate bar indeed appears powerful

but also is evenly divided between plaintiff-defendant interests, management-shareholder interests and other significant interest groups that employ lawyers. See
Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 19. Dreyfuss, however, may have unduly minimized the

degree to which the private bar so dominates a relatively small state government
and Attorney General's office, such that private interests (even usually benign ones
such as shareholder wealth) routinely overwhelm any serious reflection on public
interests implicated in corporate litigation.
2 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 29 ("Delaware's legislature is more than simply

responsive-it seems to take a lively interest in producing a genuinely functional
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lature acts wisely in part because it is influenced by a wise
specialized court. But if her view of the court is incorrect it

also undermines similarly optimistic views of Delaware law
and the role of Chancery. Furthermore, Dreyfuss underemphasizes that even if Delaware has raced to the top rather than to
the bottom, its success results from a mix of factors in addition

to the Chancery Court's semi-specialized natureY
C. The Elusive Determination of the Public Interest and
Resistance to Special Interest Groups
Much of the literature about specialized courts recognizes
that a specialized court with indirect financial clout is subject

to interest group pressure.' Dreyfuss has noted the considerable risk that competition with Delaware and those states

considering specialized business tribunals will prompt other
states to 'Tavor the interests of the businesses who litigate
before the specialized tribunal over the interests of the unseen
entities affected by their decisions-consumers, suppliers, competitors, employees, investors, and the environment."' The

point is well taken but Dreyfuss ignores that it applies with
equal force to Delaware Chancery, at least in theory and perhaps in practice.
Most commentators have described Chancery's jurispru-

dence as largely tending to favor shareholders over incumbent
product.").
" Some attorneys in the Delaware corporate bar, however, give the Chancery
Court even higher marks for speedy and less expensive disposition of cases than
does Dreyfuss. For example, practitioners have praised Chancery for its use of
streamlined summary proceedings for deciding applications to review corporate
records and election results. See Edward P. Welch & Andrew J. Turezyn, The
Delaware Court of Chancery's Use of Summary Proceedings in Three Cases Shows
that Complex Issues Can Be Decided Quickly, NATL L.J., Oct. 10, 1994, at B4. If
such praise is warranted, it seems likely that a specialized tribunal is more likely
than a generalized court to successfully adopt a streamlined method of case disposition without unduly sacrificing accuracy or fairness. If the special court has not
been compromised by special interests its expertise in the field should better enable it to carve away procedural fat without nicking the essential meat of due
process we have come to expect from both special and general courts. At the same
time, there lurks the danger that judges deeply steeped in a special field will tend
to erroneously undervalue procedural protections out of a belief that they largely
have "seen it all" before.
See infra text accompanying notes 98-121.
Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 4.
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management, although Delaware case law, especially that of
the Delaware Supreme Court, permits management considerable discretion to reject or fight tender offers, even when the
tender clearly offers short-term benefits to shareholders."
Although enhancing shareholder value may seem preferable to
protecting management, it is far from clear that shareholders'
rights should always take precedence over the interests of the
public, the government and the communities populated by the
corporation's employees." Indeed, the Delaware Supreme
Court has expressly permitted corporate managers to consider
these factors in determining whether to defend against a takeover. 2 Because the effect of Chancery and its jurisprudence
upon these entities remains sufficiently unclear, a bit of restraint is counseled before praising either the Chancery record
or concept too effusively. For example, the leading Delaware
decision permitting consideration of nonshareholder corporate
constituencies, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, resulted when the
Supreme Court reversed Chancery in part. 3
Additionally, since Delaware charters so many companies
3o See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
(Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1987), Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989 (1993) [hereinafter Hostile Takeovers];
Robert A. Ragazzo, The Legitimacy of Takeover Defense in the '90s, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 689, 718-31 (1992).
31 See Frank J. Garcia, Protecting Nonshareholder Interests in the Market for
Corporate Control: A Role for State Takeover Statutes, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 507
(1990); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
States, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992). However, shareholder preeminence seems
by far the dominant view both in America and other capitalist nations. See Owners Versus Managers, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1994, at 20. But see MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994) (modern corporation arose from combination of political and economic factors and is not as shareholder-centered in objectives as modern conventional wisdom suggests).
32 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). If a
corporation determines to sell, however, it must then work to maximize the sale
price for shareholders. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). Since Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court only has
forbidden consideration of nonshareholder interests when the corporation has determined to sell 100% of its stock. See Ragazzo, Hostile Takeovers, supra note 30, at
1030-35.
'a See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946, rev'g, No. CIV.A. 7997, 1985 WL 44691 (Del,
Ch. May 13, 1985). But Justice Moore, the author of Unocal, denies that the supreme court fails to protect shareholder interests. See Andrew G.T. Moore II, The
1980s-Did We Save the Stockholders While the CorporationBurned?, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 277, 285 (1992).
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with minimal physical in-state presence, there is little or no
political cost to Chancery or to Delaware for deciding in favor
of shareholders (or, for that matter, incumbent management or
corporate "raiders") even if it results in lost jobs, relocated
plants or decimated communities in another locale. Lawyereconomists may argue that ignoring such considerations is efficient and good. The alternative may be having corporate law
matters adjudicated in a less expert (and even less competent)
forum that has some arguable link to the nonequity entities
affected by battles over corporate control and administration.
It remains inconclusive, however, whether generalized or specialized tribunals are likely to take different tacks. Therefore
more research is needed before rushing to embrace specialized
courts as a way of minimizing the influence of extraneous
factors and misplaced sympathy on adjudication. Furthermore,
due to this lack of a firm factual assessment, we should not retain generalized courts out of a belief that they give a lessbiased hearing.
Scholars should be more precise about what exactly they
are praising when praising Delaware jurisprudence. For example, some of the leading opinions cited as evidence of the quality of Delaware jurisprudence were authored by the Delaware
Supreme Court rather than the Chancery Court.U In many of
these cases, the supreme court reversed or modified chancery
court decisions.3 5 In fact, many observers associate the per-

See, e.g., Paramount,571 A.2d at 1140; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946.
' See, e.g., Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1140 (affirming result of Court of Chancery but reformulating issue and applying different rationale); Unocal, 493 A.2d at
946 (reversing Court of Chancery). Of course, it always is debatable whether the
Chancery Court product was superior to that of the supreme court. To the extent
that scholarly commentary favors the Chancery Court in these cases, this suggests
that perhaps specialized courts really are superior, at least for corporate governance matters. If most commentary takes the opposite view it would provide another arrow in the quiver of those who wish to shoot down the specialized-court
trial balloon. Reaction to this split has been mixed. Compare Garcia, supra note
31, (generally approving supreme court deference to corporate management and
nonshareholder interest) and Ragazzo, Hostile Takeouers, supra note 30, at 990-95
with Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467 and Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161 (1981) (criticizing decisions that look beyond sale price to shareholders).
Professor Dreyfuss regards the occasional divergence of Chancery and the
Delaware Supreme Court as a healthy indication that the generalist court is pro-
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ceived high quality of Delaware jurisprudence with the
"generalist" supreme court rather than with the "specialized"
chancery court.3"
Yet Delaware is hardly a perfect laboratory for comparing
the relative virtues of generalized and specialized courts since,
as Dreyfuss notes, Chancery's scope of equity jurisdiction is
wide and its judges preside over matters other than corporate
governanceY In addition, because such a high volume of corporate litigation comprises the Delaware Supreme Court's
docket, the court is decidedly less generalist than the average
state high court. Considering the complexity of many of the
corporate law issues presented, the Delaware Supreme Court
most likely exerts more time and energy on corporate governance disputes than its overall caseload profile would suggest.
In short, Delaware Chancery is perhaps best described as
"semi-specialized," while the Delaware Supreme Court may be
characterized as "semi-generalist." The courts' unique natures
make it difficult to assess whether satisfaction with either
court lends support to the desirability of specialization in other
jurisdictions. In my assessment, while the Delaware experience
supports at least partial specialization efforts under appropriate circumstances, it also warns against excessive specialization. Delaware's experience may bolster semi-specialization
rather than provide a shining example of specialized courts.
Considering Delaware's historic and jurisdictional features,
which make it a particularly apt state for corporate law semispecialization, 8 the state's success is something less than a
conclusive statement in favor of widespread specialization of
the nation's courts.
Nonetheless, my informal conversations over the years
with practitioners suggest that lawyers who litigate corporate
law issues generally praise both the Chancery Court and the

viding a meaningful review of the specialized court. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at
28. I am inclined to agree but again note, as does Dreyfuss, that the Delaware
Supreme Court is not a purely generalist court, since it focuses on corporate governance as does much of the state's judicial business.
"' The supreme court occasionally is biting in its criticism of Chancery. See,
e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del. 1993) (concluding that Chancery applied erroneous legal standards and made "findings of fact [that) were not
the product of an orderly and deductive reasoning process").
See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 20-21.
" Dreyfuss, supra note 5 at 25-32.
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supreme court in Delaware. In general, they are most impressed with the intellectual caliber of the judges and their
speed and efficiency in administering litigation. Perhaps, as
Judge Gibbons suggests in his comments to the Symposium,
the quality of the judges and the degree of institutional support they receive determine judicial effectiveness. A high quality generalist court may be possible only where the local legal
and political culture support it. Where judgeships are prestigious and sought after by top quality attorneys and filled according to a merit system, it may be that any variety of resulting court (generalist, semi-specialist or specialist) excels'
Even the most merit-based, nonpartisan selection system,
however, will have trouble finding good judges if it fails to
provide decent pay, prestige and logistical support for the office.
Apparently, the Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware
Chancery occasionally disagree over significant issues of corporate law. If the frequency and magnitude of this disagreement
is large enough, this would tend to alter analysis of the specialized court issue. For example, if the Delaware Supreme
Court frequently and inconsistently countermands Chancery,
the argument that specialized tribunals lead to greater precision is undermined. If one thinks the supreme court is correct,
the view that specialized courts obtain more accurate adjudicatory results is similarly undermined. Applying generalizations
about the Delaware experience to the debate over specialized
courts requires a more in-depth analysis of the variations between these two prestigious Delaware courts."

H. RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE BEST ADJUDICATORS
More than a dozen years ago, Judge Richard Posner argued with characteristic wit (and with a shot at the Left):

9 See John J. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the End,
61 BROOK. L. REv. 45 (1995) (comparing experience of specialization in state family courts and federal bankruptcy court as examples of relatively unsuccessful and
successful specialization, respectively).
' See infra text accompanying notes 42-61 (discussing judicial quality).
"' These differences also have implications for the emerging view that specialized courts are most effective when used for trial adjudication but subject to general appellate review. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
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One does not have to be a Marxist, steeped in notions of anomie and
alienation, to realize that monotonous jobs are unfulfilling for many
people, especially educated and intelligent people, and that the
growth of specialization has given to many white-collar jobs a degree
of monotony formerly found only on assembly lines. [Judicial activity] is repeated over and over and over again [and thus has] an undeniable element of the monotonous.... While there are able people
who would like nothing better than to spend twenty or thirty years
just judging appeals in tax or patent or social security or antitrust
cases, I do not think it would be easy to maintain a high quality
federal appeals bench on such a diet.42

Despite Judge Posner's eloquence, I do not expect a sudden, furious exodus of judges leaving the nation's courts. Even
with an unfortunate degree of repetition and other drawbacks,43 the judiciary, particularly the federal bench, continues to attract many of the most talented lawyers and public
servants."

42 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?:
An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 761, 779-80 (1983) [hereinafter Essay on Delegation]. Judge Posner has implicitly reiterated these views concerning judicial motivation and satisfaction. See
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 21, at 123-44; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-

NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.7, at 534-35 (1992); Richard A. Posner, What Do

Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S. CT. ECON. REV. 2
(1993).
No wonder Judge Gibbons left the bench for academia! Reading Posner's passage I am amazed that Judge Gibbons survived as he did for more than two decades on the bench. Can Judge Newman's return to private practice--or perhaps
even to a chemistry lab-be far behind?
' See generally Lauren Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptions to
Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 3.
" See EMILY F. VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL

JUDICIAL SERVICE, 1789-1992, at 126 (1993) (of 2627 judges in study, only 15 resigned due to admitted dissatisfaction with job).
In touching upon this issue before this panel, 50% of which is composed of
two renowned judges, I feel a bit like the character standing on line at the movies
with Woody Allen and Diane Keaton in Annie Hall. In one scene Woody and Diane are standing on line next to an insufferable bore who regales his companion
with pompous pseudo-intellectualisms about Marshall McLuhan, the media expert.
See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN & R. POWERS, THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1968); MARSHALL
MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE (1965); MARSHALL
McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (2d ed. 1964). At

that point, Woody pulls the real Marshall McLuhan from behind a curtain and
McLuhan tells the blowhard that he completely misunderstands the media guru's
writings. In similar fashion, saying anything about judges and their work or attitudes in front of Judges Gibbons and Newman exposes me to the imminent possi-
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Yet, at the same time, Judge Posner understates the problem when he suggests that the "monotony problem" in judging
varies greatly between generalist and specialist courts." Repetition, boredom and frustration affect even the elite Article III
federal courts of our system, and are disincentives to attracting
and retaining the best jurists. 6
Similarly, in America's urban areas, federal trial courts
are perilously close to becoming specialized criminal courts.
Indeed, they may be on their way to becoming specialized drug
courts. Critics of specialized courts often speak as though they
are comparing the specialized courts to idealized general courts
that brim with the vitality of a balanced caseload. When compared to the reality of presiding over drug busts and cargo
thefts at Kennedy Airport, serving on a specialized court devoted to business disputes, even a narrow swath of business disputes, might look pretty attractive.
Hence, I hesitate to accept as gospel the notion that greater judicial specialization inevitably brings with it at least some
decline in the quality of the adjudicators. The experience of the

bility of embarrassment via the "Marshall McLuhan Putdowm." Notwithstanding
this danger, I cannot resist some observations about the purported "judicial recruitment" problem in the specialized courts.
See infra text accompanying note 55.
See Robel, supra note 43, at 8-11. In addition to field surveys and statistics
on attrition in the judiciary, two anecdotes stand out in my mind as illustrating
this point. I can still vividly recall a program I attended as a young and fairly
impressionable law student at which former Judge Marvin Frankel was one of the
participants. A fellow student asked Frankel why he left the bench. With a tone of
world-weariness, Frankel looked at my classmate and said, "if I had to give just
one more jury instruction in a drug possession and distribution case-just one-I
would have gone out of my mind." Frankel then took on a somewhat more
sprightly but related tone saying "I was raised in the Jewish tradition that said
you should be learning something new at your job, at least once in a while" and
that judging no longer fulfilled that requirement for him. Judge Frankel was one
of the 15 federal judges since 1789 to have resigned due to dissatisfaction. See
VAN TASSEL, supra note 44, at 126-30. Joining Frankel in this club are former
judges Robert Bork and Philip Tone.
More recently, I spoke with a newly appointed federal judge who was formerly a law school dean in the New York area and a former U.S. Attorney with extensive criminal law experience. I commented that I assumed he would be eager
to adjudicate the crowded criminal docket of his court and was perhaps only mildly interested in civil litigation. "Oh no," he replied, "the civil stuff is what will
make it interesting. The criminal matters can get pretty repetitive."
It appears to me that both these judges are right and that Judge Po3ner is
both right and wrong.
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Federal Circuit, in fact, as Dreyfuss chronicles in her lengthy
1989 case study, suggests quite the opposite. Significantly,
many observers see a further improvement in quality of the
Federal Circuit since its status was upgraded to that of an
appellate court of Article III stature.47 This suggests that the
critical value in attracting top quality judges may not be due to
the scope of the court's subject matter so much as it is the
stature of the court-a point essentially made in Judge
Gibbons' commentary comparing the family court and bankruptcy court experiences.4"
As Dreyfuss reminds us, and her earlier work studying the
Federal Circuit confirms,4" stature cannot be conferred magically from on high or manufactured overnight but rather requires history, tradition, performance and good fortune. 0 She
generally praises the Federal Circuit's performance and few
seem to disagree. Yet in the marketplace of legal stature the
Federal Circuit seems less prestigious than the "regular" federal Courts of Appeals, including the "new" Eleventh Circuit that
was created at approximately the same time by dividing the
old Fifth Circuit. Although it is probably bad manners to say
so on a program with a distinguished Federal Circuit judge, I
am willing to bet that law students seeking judicial clerkships-from the most elite institutions to the most fledgling
operations beginning to seek accreditation-would rather obtain a job clerking in the Second or Third or other generalist
circuit than with the Federal Circuit.
This probably results from the misplaced elitism of a profession of resum6-builders seeking to maximize our options.
The caliber of the Federal Circuit bench, however, seems at
least the equivalent of the other circuits. In fact, the quality of
Federal Circuit opinions frequently seems distinctly higher
than that typically found in the some generalist Circuits."'

"" See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 65-67.
48 See Gibbons, supra note 39 at 46-47.
9 See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 60-64.
By contrast, in Professor Dreyfuss's view, circumstances have combined to

"

make Delaware Chancery a court of stature unlikely to be replicated by the commercial court proposals under consideration in Pennsylvania. Dreyfuss, supra note
5, at 24-32.
" This blunt opinion is an impressionistic one formed from years of reading
cases. I have never systematically categorized or studied jurisprudence by circuit
and, of course, I could be wrong.
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What then, other than history, accounts for the stature differences? Are they inextricably linked to specialization? Will
these differences disappear over time and are they cause for
action or concern?
Specialized jurists generally are accorded less prestige
than generalized jurists and certainly less prestige than they
deserve. Part of the problem, of course, is the larger problem of
federal-state status. Most specialized judges operate in state
systems which by definition lack federal stature, much less
Article III stature. Furthermore, many of the state specialty
courts-such as the Family Court and the Surrogate's Court in
New York-are devoted to topics that the profession's elite has
denominated, unfairly in my view, as less important areas of
law or even legal backwaters. 2
In essence, there is stigma in specialization. Problematically, it has become fashionable for those who urge a contraction of federal jurisdiction, in some small-stakes cases, to
prioritize efficiency over correct procedure. At the risk of
sounding antediluvian, I continue to hold to the romantic notion that courts really should take all disputes seriously and
strive to adjudicate them accurately and fairly (so long as the
cost of doing so is not prohibitive). Specialization is troubling
when it appears to produce second-rate adjudication. Specialization that accepts second-class adjudication as a starting
point is abominable and should not be supported by the legal
profession.
Consequently, specialization initiatives should be warmly
received only if they include reasonable attempts to close the
"stature gap." One obvious avenue for this is to raise the trappings of stature attendant to the office. For example, any specialized judges in the federal system could be made Article III
judges. The experience of the Federal Circuit, however, reveals
that this alone will not completely close the stature gap. In

The former is unfairly characterized as a forum for hashing out marital
spats and trading on gossip when it in fact addresses many of the key issues
concerning our social fabric. The latter is viewed as the dusty domain of tortured
Edwardian prose and arcane technicalities as well as something of a vultures club
for feasting on the remains of the decedents accumulated wealth. Rumors of favoritism abound as well. But, when forced to reflect, we all would agree that the
marshalling and disposition of citizen wealth is a most fundamentally important
task in a capitalist society.
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addition, there may be sound management reasons for declining to provide specialized judges with the life tenure and salary protections of Article III judgeship. For example, as many
noted during the time of the post-Northern Pipeline debate regarding the future of bankruptcy judges,53 the size of the specialized caseload may wax and wane. By contrast, the need for
generalized judges is likely to remain steady and probably will
increase. Moreover, whatever the projections of future caseload
demands, a political ceiling also restrains the number of Article III judges that Congress and the Executive will permit.
My preliminary view holds that policymakers have revered
the Article III judgeship excessively and have been too
grudging in extending it to areas of specialization such as
bankruptcy, international trade and challenges to administrative action. In reality, the steady demand for bankruptcy adjudication during the past twenty years suggests that fears of a
sharp downturn in the market for special expertise may be
overstated. Although the possibility still exists that caseloads
will shift, in the event of a dearth of cases within specialist
judges' areas of expertise, Congress could require Article III
judges to hear cases according to need.
Other methods also may enhance the stature of specialized
courts, if the body politic holds firmly to the view that adding
waves of Article III specialized judges would inhibit flexibility,
planning and fiscal health of the judiciary too greatly. Even
without life tenure, specialized judges can enjoy stature enhancements. The most obvious way is through salary increas-

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), held that bankruptcy courts, as Article I courts, could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction only over "core" bankruptcy matters and did not have final adjudicatory authority over those claims arising in bankruptcy that involved non-bankruptcy matters (such as state-law-based contract claims). The Court realized that
its 5 to 4 decision would throw sand in the gears of the judicial machine and
stayed its mandate. It took Congress until 1984 to rectify the problem by amending the statute to give bankruptcy judges authority over "core" bankruptcy matters
but treat their decisions on non-core matters as the equivalent of a magistrate's
report and recommendation.
Congress considered making bankruptcy judges Article III judges with life
tenure and protection against salary reduction, but refrained, largely out of a fear
that the future federal judicial docket might not require a full complement of
bankruptcy judges. Although Article I judges have job security (10 years for bankruptcy judges), their positions can be more easily eliminated than those of Article
III judges.
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es. If we want specialized judges to shed their Rodney
Dangerfield robes and obtain their proper share of respect, we
probably should pay them more-significantly more-than we
pay generalist judges of the same judicial system. Like it or
not, in our society people tend to equate income and wealth
with ability and prestige. A better-paid post generally will
attract better candidates and generally will be more respected
by users and viewers of the court system.' Income differential might well influence a potential nominee's choice. Even
those nominees who do not "need" the money may be influenced by the perception of prestige higher salaries create. Most
lawyers of stature have more than a bit of ego and like to be
paid what they think they are worth.
In addition, specialized judges could be given superior
facilities and equipment, including more staff and a generous
travel or professional education budget.5 For example, specialists who are at a disadvantage in recruiting law clerks perhaps should be allowed to interview and hire law clerks well
before their generalist colleagues." Specialty courts should be
"A historical anecdote tends to confirm that money matters more to prospective judges than the conventional wisdom cares to admit. See generally GORDON
RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT
APPEAIS (1980). President William Howard Tafts original nominee for presiding
judge of the court was Alfred Coxe, who was then a sitting judge on the Sixth
Circuit. Why would a sitting regional circuit judge consider making such a switch?
Perhaps it was the adventure of being on the ground floor of a great new project
or the opportunity to exercise administrative leadership as presiding judge. Or
perhaps it was the money. The Tariff Act of 1909, CI. 6, § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 105
(1909), set the Customs Court judicial salary at $10,000 while the normal Article
M appeals court salary was $7000. The distinction was controversial and was
eliminated before any Customs Court judges took office. See RICH, supra, at 7-8.
"Following the equalization of the salaries of judges, Judge Coxe indicated that he
was no longer interesting in serving on the new court." Revesz, supra note 2, at
1154-55 n.174 (citing RICH, supra, at 8).
Although it is tempting to characterize Judge Coxe in hindsight as a venal
and short-sighted jurist, most of us at least would be interested in the opportunity
to increase our pay by 43%. For example, if an Article I federal district or circuit judge's pay increased by that proportion, they would earn around $180,000
per year rather than the $130,000 they currently receive.
' I remember as a law student rethinking my position about the relative prestige of the Court of Claims when I was told by a former law clerk that the building housing the court in Washington, D.C. was state-of-the-art and included an onsight health club facility. Of course, this did not prompt me to view the Claims
Court as more prestigious than federal district courts, but it certainly raised the
Claims Court's stature a notch when I found out it was receiving decent logistical
support from Congress.
11 Unfortunately, it appears that many judges view clerkship application dead-
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the first to get new technologies, enhanced security 7 or any
other perquisite of judicial office.
Ultimately, however, one cannot expect mere money and
perks realistically to equalize the historic status gap between

generalist and specialist courts. Some differential may be inherent in the history of the nation-generalist courts pre-date

specialist ones. Furthermore, the enterprise of identifying a
court as specialized is shadowed by the ethos of frontier democracy and the myth of the well-rounded citizen observed by
deToqueville nearly two centuries ago. 8 Consequently, differentiating a court from the mainstream implies that both it and
its subject matter are less important.
The twentieth century's focus on constitutional law and
civil rights exacerbates this negative impression of specialized
courts. This focus has become particularly pronounced since
5 9 and has shaped virtually all
Brown v. Board of Education
aspects of America's modern political community. It is no accident that the most prominent figures in modern American
jurisprudence (whether judge, professor or practitioner) have
been constitutionalists. ° Not surprisingly, no court reformer
has suggested a specialized constitutional court and such a
suggestion would likely not be embraced by the profession.6

lines and restrictions as suggestions rather than commandments. The target time
for law students to apply for federal court clerkships has crept up earlier and
earlier in students' law school careers and now appears to feature second- year
law students applying at the end of the Fall Semester. If specialist federal judges
were "allowed" to interview and hire during the Fall Semester, the odds are that
generalist judges would start doing so as well, regardless of any ostensible restrictions.
" After the murder of Eleventh Circuit Judge Robert Vance in 1989, the Judicial Conference of the United States explored the prospect of, among other things,
equipping judges' cars with automatic starters. Congress so quickly balked at the
$300 per car price tag that the suggestion was never officially considered via an
appropriation or authorization bill. John Murawski, Torching of Judge's Van Puts
Focus on Security, LEGAL TIMES, June 29, 1992, at 2.
"' See generally ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMIERICA (1835).

59 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60See, e.g., BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
164-66 (1994).
1 In addition, the prevailing view is that specialization is unlikely to work
well where the specialized subject matter is one that is highly contentious. See
Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 414-18. Dreyfuss concludes as I do that a specialized
constitutional tribunal fails on its merits as well. Judge Posner also agrees. See
Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 780. It bears mentioning, however,
that resistance to the notion logically would be both for legitimate reasons and
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Arguments over Article I versus Article I status thus frequently skirt the quality question itself. If, for example, it is
true that specialized tribunals attract less able personnel,
restricting specialist judges to only Article I status will not
solve this problem so much as it will sweep it under the rug.
Although we can take some comfort in having a relatively
small, elite, top notch Article MIjudiciary, this provides cold
comfort if the base of our system is filled with Article I tribunals staffed with inadequately supported, inferior personnel
deciding vital social matters.
The debate over the merits of specialization and the sociology of the professions also must consider the role lawyers play.
Compared to the amount of theorizing regarding the effects of
specialization on judicial recruitment, discussion of the effects
of specialization on the behavior of lawyers has been neglected.
The limited existing conventional wisdom suggests that lawyer
quality will be relatively unaffected by specialization.'
Lawyer behavior is even less considered than lawyer recruitment. Specialization, however, may offer some improvement to the profession. When appearing before a generalist
judge who is relatively unfamiliar with a particular type of
case, advocates today generally "overlawyer" by spelling out all
conceivably relevant or useful facts in the record.' Lawyers
in non-specialized courts provide extensive background information and outline the basic legal framework in briefs and
motion papers, or they wax eloquent about the legislative background of the statute at issue in the case. A full-flowered litigating method should be less necessary before a specialized
reasons rooted in the constitutional bar's desire to preserve its relative stature in
American law.
' For example, Judge Posner implies that lawyers are not nearly so affected
by the boredom and recruitment problem within a specialized court system as are
judges. Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 779-80. Acknowledging that
"most good lawyers today are specialists," he stresses the
distinction between specialization of function and specialization of subject
matter. The antitrust lawyer specializes in one field of law but his daily
rounds are more varied than those of the appellate judges---sometimes he
is trying (more likely pretrying) a case, sometimes he is arguing an appeal, sometimes he is counseling a client. He does not "relate to" his
field in a single way.
Id. at 780.
' For example, a witness at a deposition or on the stand may he asked for extensive explanation about the business or product involved in the litigation.
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tribunal, and as lawyers realize this they will streamline their
cases accordingly. While some cases undoubtedly will require
extensive activity, in a specialized forum lawyers are likely to
direct more of this activity toward the vital aspects of the case
rather than to matters likely to be self-evident to the experienced, specialized judges.
Specialized court litigators and judges possibly will be
drawn toward the minutiae of their cases as only experts can.
Just as one school of thought argues that specialized or expert
judges are more likely to discern and differ over the fine points
of a matter,' specialist lawyers may prove even more adept
than "generic" lawyers at turning mountains into molehills.
Yet, for the most part, top-notch lawyers increasingly are specialists and therefore more likely than neophytes to discern
which litigation activities are worthwhile. When these lawyers
over-litigate a case it is usually a function of the high stakes
involved in the case rather than a product of the lawyer's expertise.65 Where specialized courts process less-complex cases
involving less risk, lawyers as well as judges should be able to
apply economies of scale to reduce the costs of proceedings.
Unfortunately, this posited efficiency may advantage more
powerful repeat litigants at the expense of weaker parties with
less access to sophisticated legal assistance.
III. THE SPECIFICS OF SPECIALIZATION: HAVE SPECIALIZED
TRIBUNALS RECEIVED A BUM RAP?
Reasonable lawyers can and do differ about the wisdom of
increased specialization, yet both sides tend to agree on the
ostensible advantages and disadvantages of specialized tribunals, even if they disagree about the significance of these factors. The standard arguments of those in favor of specialization, already well summarized by Professor Dreyfuss, posit
that its advantages include: improved precision and predictability of adjudication; more accurate adjudication; more coherent articulation of legal standards; greater expertise of the

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985);
Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 781.
"s See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Advertising By Lawyers: A Market Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1091-92 (1983).
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bench; economies of scale that flow from division of labor, particularly including speed, reduced costs and greater efficiency
through streamlining of repetitive tasks and wasted motions.6 6
In contrast, an equally long list of arguments against specialization posits that a specialized court is less desirable for
such reasons as its tendency to: attract lower quality jurists;
become isolated and unable to reap the benefits of "percolation"
and "cross-fertilization" that often provide additional information and current developments in the law to generalist courts;
be vulnerable to interest-group manipulation, particularly in
the selection of judges; lack independence since they are more
easily monitored by the legislature and the executive; lack the
widespread public acceptance and perception of fairness that
traditionally surround generalist courts; lack geographic diversity; create difficulties in dividing the spheres of authority
among a mix of generalist and specialized courts; and, make
the judicial system less responsive to changes in the caseload
mix of the court system.6
Although observers on both sides of the debate over judicial specialization have marshalled sophisticated arguments,
they tend to overstate their cases, creating caricatures of general and specialized courts. The tendency to overmodel the
issue is so pronounced that one must search hard for examples
of real world courts that actually meet the standard academic
definition of specialized courts as "forums of highly limited
jurisdiction to which all of the cases of a particular type are
channeled. " s The most widely cited and studied examples-Delaware Chancery, the Federal CircuitP and the federal Bankruptcy CourteL-are described more accurately as
semi-specialized courts, since they either are not stringently
limited or do not exercise complete dominion over an area.

See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 10-20.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 17-22; Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra
note 42, at 777-90.
1 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 5.
See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 4.
70 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET"AL, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Banhruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993);
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Banhruptcy Reorganization of Large Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993).
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As Dreyfuss notes, Delaware Chancery was structured as
a general equity court but happens to be located in a state
where equitable relief is frequently sought concerning important corporate matters.7 1 Chancery frequently decides the
most prominent corporate battles of the day-which tends to
support Dreyfuss's assessment of its high quality-but lacks
exclusive jurisdiction. Often disputants can litigate outside
Delaware, even if Delaware substantive law is controlling.7 2
The Federal Circuit, as Dreyfuss 73 and Judge Newman"
have noted, is specialized but hardly narrow. Although predominantly known as a patent law court, it addresses a wide
range of issues-including tax, Indian claims, trademark,
childhood vaccine, veterans appeals and government contract
law. Judge Newman even questions the very accuracy of describing the Federal Circuit as a court concentrating on patent
law, since only sixteen percent of its filings are patent law cases. 71 In addition, as Dreyfuss has noted, the well-pleaded complaint rule, which requires that plaintiffs complaint present
patent issues as part of an essential ingredient in a patent
claim, further limits the Federal Circuit's ability to decide patent issues. Patent issues raised in defense still can be adjudicated in the other general jurisdiction regional federal
courts 7. 6

Similarly, the bankruptcy court exclusively controls core

71 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 6.
72 See, e.g., Lyman Lumber Co. v. Favorite Constr. Co., 584 N.W.2d 484, 489

(Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
7' See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 30-52.
7' See Pauline Newman, The Sixth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: Commentary
on the Paper by Professor Dreyfuss, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 58-60 (1995); Pauline
Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Ability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 683, 683-84 (1993).
7 This figure may be deceptive, however, in that it focuses only on the aggregate number of filings. As Felix Frankfurter and others have long noted, all cases
are not created equal. See WiLLiAi 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 45 (1980).
Some require distinctly more effort to adjudicate. It seems reasonable that patent
cases may require more judicial time and effort than other cases on the Federal
Circuit docket. In addition, the relative decline in patent cases as a percentage of
the total Federal Circuit docket also can be seen as reflecting a reduced litigation
rate resulting from the increased predictability and coherence brought to this area
of law by the court. Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 23-24. It appears, however,
that the proportionate decline in the patent cases as a percentage of the docket
results simply from the greater increase in other areas of the court's workload.
76 See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 33-36.
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bankruptcy matters but cannot render final judgment on nonbankruptcy legal claims affecting debtors or their estates.' In
cases affecting an estate, Article I bankruptcy judges are limited to making reports and recommendations.78 In addition,
bankruptcy judge determinations are subjected to review by
the generalist federal district and circuit courts.79
The boundary between specialized and generalist courts,
however, is not nearly so bright as commonly assumed. The
supposedly general courts in our system may have a less diverse menu of cases than is commonly assumed-at least when
one measures how generalized judges spend their time, particularly in the courtroom rather than in chambers.' The objections to specialized tribunals probably are overstated: generalized courts are not nearly so intellectually attractive and
Olympian in perspective; specialized courts are not nearly so
narrow and monotonous.
Professor Dreyfuss's "reality check" assessments of Delaware Chancery and the Federal Circuit refute the weight of
academic conventional wisdom and reveal two semi-specialized
courts that function fairly effectively. Although, as Dreyfuss
emphasizes, it may be difficult to replicate the positive aspects
of these courts, their tangible adjudication should not be dismissed casually with an "it can't work anywhere else" response. Professor Dreyfuss's endorsement of these courts in
part results from their semi-specialized or hybrid nature. It
also suggests that the array of criticisms directed toward specialization are overstated, even when applied to the
prototypical narrowly specialized courts of theory.
A. Quality
I already have discussed the excessive pessimism regarding the quality of jurists in a specialized courts. As Judge Gibbons observes in his comments about Dreyfuss's paper, the
manner in which judges are identified, recruited, screened and

See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. VI 1994); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
' 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. VI 1994).
' 28 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. VI 1994).

See supra note 46, discussing anecdotes about federal judge inundation with
criminal drug matters.
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selected probably affects the quality of the bench more than
does the composition of the particular court's doctrine.8 The
perception of specialized court judges as inferior may result
from our stewardship of these courts rather than of specialization generally. Further examination of particular specialized
courts may indicate that the shortcomings of such courts stem
from factors other than specialization.8 2 In any event, more
research is needed.
B. Isolation
Similar to reservations about the quality of judges in a
system of specialized tribunals, commentators also have overstated their isolation argument. Critics of specialized courts
contend that they are less likely to render sound decisions
because of their lack of exposure to the range of cases, legal
theories and doctrinal refinements enjoyed by generalist judges.8 3 In addition, because specialized courts at the appellate
level are the proverbial "last word" on their subject matter,
they are thought to have less "percolation" of ideas than the
regional variation of generalist appellate panels.' 4
The percolation argument typically is advanced with the
federal appeals courts as the implicit model. The percolation
hypothesis works best where courts are dispersed geographically and given independent authority. This allows alternative
lines of analysis to develop without the truncation that may
result from early and tight judicial control of a topic. Of course,
this percolation and cross-fertilization often comes at the cost
of increased expense and delay, as well as decreases in preci-

81

See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 46-47 (contrasting generally high quality of

federal bankruptcy court with less satisfactory experience of state family courts).
82 See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 47.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 17; Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note
42, at 787. As a possible example of the dangers of specialist oversight, see Committee on Patents, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Fromson
Rule: Should the Respect for Patent Rights Take Procedure Over the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 49 REcoRD 969 (1994) (criticizing Federal Circuit for insufficient protection of privilege in order to focus on substantive patent law outcome). I note Professor Dreyfuss was a member of the Committee on Patents at the time of the
Report.
84 See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 17; Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note
42, at 787.
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sion, predictability and coherence.' Although further empirical experience is needed to evaluate this tradeoff, the question
itself suggests that specialized courts have been maligned too
greatly. Under this model, percolation and cross-fertilization
may be worth sacrificing for greater precision and coherence.
Looking to percolation in the state systems, however, yields
the opposite result.
While the percolation thesis falters when applied to a state
system where courts and judges are in closer geographical and
cultural proximity, it is somewhat workable in larger states.
For example, the four intermediate appellate departments in
the New York judicial system often differ on issues-as do
panels within each department and trial court judges-even
though all are ostensibly obliged to follow intermediate appellate precedent, even that of other appellate departments. Thus,
when the New York Court of Appeals reviews a Second Department case that arose from a dispute in Kings County, the high
court often has an array of alternative approaches to consider.
Consequently, the posited benefits of percolation seem genuine.
Percolation-based arguments against actual specialization,
however, only provide a loose fit between theory and reality.
Despite the wide adherence to the percolation and cross-fertilization arguments, there appears to be no dramatic evidence of
specialized courts making erroneous decisions, deciding issues
too quickly or too firmly, or basing their decisions on too narrow a base of fact, law or nonlegal information. Most of the
examples cited in support of this argument against specialized
courts have referred to generalist court episodes of late-breaking epiphany, and rhetorically ask: what would have happened
if a specialized court had addressed the issue?
The implicit answer is that doctrinal or other refinements
designed to overcome injustice are less likely to occur in the
specialized court. This argument seems unpersuasive. For
example, commentators have noted that in the famous Dalkon

During the past decade, the seemingly prevailing scholarly opinion concluded
that intercircuit conflicts were not a sufficiently serious problem to merit greater
Supreme Court review of such conflicts. See JOHN SEXTON & SAM.tuEL ESTREicHER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS WORKLOAD 1 (1986). However, a recent study suggests that a more serious intercircuit conflicts exist than had been previously
thought. See Marcia Coyle, Study: Circuit Conflicts Are Left Unaddressed, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at A18.
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Shield litigation, defendant A.H. Robins initially succeeded
with a defense strategy that denied any liability, failed to produce incriminating documents, and attempted to make every
case a referendum on the worth of each plaintiff." For the
first few years of the litigation, most generalist courts permitted A.H. Robins to probe extensively during discovery into each
plaintiffs personal sexual history-an experience sufficiently
uncomfortable to prompt many plaintiffs into earlier settlement for less money.8 7 Some courts permitted such matter to
be introduced at trial, and this may well have aided in some of
the early defense verdicts in the Dalkon Shield saga.'
But in the mid-1980s, the A.H. Robins defense began to
erode and soon failed as a result of different judicial attitudes
towards limiting the admissibility of evidence and the scope of
discovery in order to protect women's privacy.89 In addition,
witnesses and suppressed documents surfaced that refuted
earlier A.H. Robins's assertions and tended to ease plaintiffs'
means of proving negligence or even willful disregard of
plaintiffs' rights.9" In short, judges got tougher on Robins and

" In particular, A.H. Robins argued that the infertility or infection allegedly
caused by the Dalkon Shield could have resulted from the other factors such as
pelvic inflammatory disease that arguably was correlated to venereal disease or
multiple sex partners or both. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION:
THE ABUSE OF POWER 105 (1990); SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN,
LORD'S JUSTICE (1985); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN
& THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); Richard L. Marcus, Book Note, 99 HARV. L. REV.
875 (1986).
' See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991
U. ILL. L. FORUM 457; see also Roger Tuttle, The Dalkon Shield Disaster Ten
Years Later-A Historical Perspective, 54 OKLA. L.J. 2501 (1983); Marcus, supra
note 86 at 876 n.7.
' See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987); Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
See, e.g., Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1224-27; Palmer, 684 P.2d at 197-200.
'0 See CLINARD, supra note 86, at 105; ENGELMAYER & WAGMAN, supra note
86, at 194-226. A particularly embarrassing moment for Robins occurred when
Roger Tuttle, a former in-house lawyer then teaching law school, testified regarding the existence of certain knowledge and documents about the shield that had
not been properly shared with plaintiffs in response to valid discovery requests.
See Andrew Blum, Larger Robins Probe Under Way?: Indicted Expert Denies
Charges, NA'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 10; Charles P. Alexander, Robins Runs for
Shelter: The Drugmaker Files for Bankruptcy to Cope with Dalkon Shield Disaster,
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1985, at 32.
This information eventually surfaced and proved crucial in spurring the plaintiff awards that triggered the mammoth A.H. Robins bankruptcy and a special
claims tribunal for Dalkon Shield victims. See Georgene M. Vairo, Reinventing
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were gentler on plaintiffs as the generalist courts eventually
percolated and cross-fertilized toward justice."
Incidents like these are not exactly ringing endorsements
of generalized courts, however. These generalist courts took
more than ten years to begin to adjudicate these cases fully
and fairly.92 In addition, episodes like these do not establish a
compelling basis for doubting that specialized courts will learn
from earlier mistakes. To be sure, when legal issues are dispersed among several courts with independent authority, percolation and reconsideration of error are at least partially facilitated. However, this advantage of generalist courts (especially
in the far-flung federal system) is probably overstated.
Specialized courts could be established to allow for review
of trial court decisions by a variety of generalist appeals
courts. Indeed, theorists suggest this may be the optimal model
Civil Procedure: Will the New Procedural Regime Help Resolve Mass Torts?, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 1065 (1993); Georgene K. Vairo, The Dalhon Shield Claimants
Trust ParadigmLost (Or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992).
" Most observers see this latter regime as the correct one. The earlier, wrongheaded approach to the Dalkon litigation, which was credulous of A.H. Robins and
ineffective in enforcing discovery rights but simultaneously harsh on plaintiff privacy and prejudice rights, probably also resulted from judicial insensitivity that abated because of scholarly and popular criticism, as well as increasing social
awareness of women's issues. But whatever one's view, there is no denying the
judicial shift.
I2 I realize I am mixing apples and oranges by analogizing from tort law. M3t
suggestions favorable to specialization advocate it for contract, corporate or commercial disputes and often expressly reject specialization for more value-laden or
less objectively quantifiable subjects such as torts, products liability, civil rights or
constitutional law. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61. Furthermore, the
Dalkon Shield litigation may not the most apt illustration, both because it is controversial and because the switch in adjudication did not involve substantive legal
doctrine so much as procedural doctrine, and all courts must have a set of procedural rules or norms. But to some extent that is my point- whatever wisdom comes from cross-fertilization and percolation will be essentially as likely to descend
upon specialized tribunals as upon the generalist courts.
By way of other examples of percolation-prompted shifts in the law, see Wil1am N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage
Rules Consonant With the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale
and Loan Transactions, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083 (1984). See also JOHN E. NOWACK ET
AL., CONsTITrIONAL LAW §§ 4.6-4.7, 4.10(d), at 150-54, 166-87 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing Supreme Court's switch regarding interpretations of the Tenth Amendment
(in less than 10 years, no less!), incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees through
the Fourteenth Amendment, altered scope of legality of federal legislation based on
interest commerce power, change in perspective about Article I courts); CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, LAV OF FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 752-53 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing
eventual demise of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine).
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for specialization.93 In addition, even a wrongheaded doctrine
enunciated and enforced by an all-powerful specialist appeals
court is subject to revisitation in subsequent cases. Prevailing
theory suggests that problematic legal rules are more likely to
be relitigated.94 Furthermore, trial judges subject to wrongheaded rules-whether by generalist or specialist
courts-probably will attempt to modify the worst features of
the rule. They will tend to ignore, distinguish or misapply the
rule, even to the point of disobedience, in order to enervate the
bad rule or prompt appellate reconsideration.95 Although percolation may be easier under a generalist structure, it is not
impossible in a specialized regime.
Similarly, the cross-fertilization argument is caricatured.
Simply because a judge sits on a specialized court does not
mean that he or she is a narrow person with no interest in law
or life generally. Just as specialist lawyers have broad professional and personal interests,96 so do specialist judges. There
is no solid basis for assuming that specialist judges are any
more provincial than are judges, law professors and lawyers
generally. Moreover, the practitioner and academic consensus
seems to be that specialist courts (such as Bankruptcy and the
Federal Circuit) improve in personnel and product when given
greater stature and incentives to join the bench.9"

93 See infra text accompanying notes 143-62.
9' See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga.
tion, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 52 (1984).
" Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 820-28 (1994); Michael S. Paulsen, Accusing Justice:
Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7-8 J.L.
RELIGION 33, 85-87 (1989-90).
" See Nadine Brozman, William Kunstler Makes Connections in the Course of
His Television Acting Debut, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at B26 (describing various
activities of prominent civil liberties lawyer); Jan Hoffman, People v. Hamlet: A
Case of Infinite Jest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at B1 (describing mock trial of
Hamlet where the Prince was represented by Daniel J. Kornstein, a New York
litigator and author of Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal (1994)
and numerous other law and literature works).
After the presentation and discussion of Prof. Dreyfuss's Pomerantz Lecture, I
encountered several judges of specialized courts at a post-program reception. Even
in brief conversation, they reflected substantial breadth of professional knowledge
and interest outside their courts' own fields of specialty.
' See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 47.
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C. Interest Group Capture

Perhaps the most serious charge against specialized
courts, besides the quality problem, is that they are more
prone to interest group dominance or even "capture." The argument assumes that placing all of a substantive legal area's
"eggs" in the "basket" of a specialized tribunal will make the

court so attractive that special interest groups will devote
greater resources to influencing its composition and operation.

This argument, which builds on public choice scholarship of
the past three decades," assumes that these interest group

resources will succeed in gaining influence and that dominant
groups will fail to reflect public sentiment generally or the
public interest. 9

Prevailing theory on specialized courts posits that they
frequently are targeted by interest group activity and are more
likely than are generalist courts to be "captured" by powerful
interest groups0 0 and become indirectly politicized. Although

Dreyfuss suggests that the Chancery Court has not encountered this particular problem, recent news reports in Delaware
suggest that at least the perception of interest group politick-

ing surrounds the Delaware courts.01 Generalist

courts

"8 Particularly, JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1964); Mancur Olsen, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965), and their
progeny. To some extent the entire public-choice movement can be seen as offspring of JAMES BUCHANAN ET AL., A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1957).
' Of course, some public choice theorists would argue that the notion of a
public interest is merely romantic nostalgia mixed with eighth-grade civics, but the
general view across the political spectrum is that fair observers can often distinguish between private-regarding and public-regarding legislation and adjudication.
See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
1& See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
,' Earlier this year, for example, former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G.T. Moore 1, a 12-year veteran of the Court, was "ousted by the state's
judicial nominating commission," which declined to renominate him for a 12-year
term. Ex-Judge Joins Wasserstein, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1994, at B5.
Mr. Moore was viewed by members of the corporate-takeover bar
and institutional-investor groups as a critic of hostile takeovers and as
relatively sympathetic to shareholder interests. Both groups lobbied
strongly against his removal, which sparked allegations that people connected to the New York law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
influenced the outcome. Skadden Arps often has represented acquirors in
hostile bids.
Mr. Moore's successor, Carolyn Berger, a judge on the Delaware
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Court of Chancery, was among the founding lawyers when Skadden
opened its Delaware office in 1979, and several Skadden partners in
Delaware have been influential in advising Governor Thomas Carper on
matters involving courts and judges. Governor Carper and Skadden Arps
have strongly denied that the law firm influenced the change in the
court.
Id.; accord Diana B. Henriques, Top Court Under Fire: Critics Say Politics Is
Hurting Delaware Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at B1.
Just as I am urging restraint in judging specialized tribunals, I would not
make too much of this episode in particular. I emphasize that no newspaper account of the Moore-Berger switch has presented any evidence of any impropriety.
As Dreyfuss noted in her paper, "minimal evidence of capture at the appointment
stage exists," and the litigants equal footing in terms of financing and representation protects against capture while on the bench. Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 22.
Nonetheless, it was the first time in approximately six decades that a sitting
Delaware Supreme Court Justice was not reappointed. See Richard B. Schmitt,
New Judge on Delaware Top Court Is Viewed as Friend of Shareholders, WALL ST.
J., July 7, 1994, at B2. Furthermore, as Dreyfuss also notes in her paper, even an
unfounded perception of unfairness can do substantial damage. Dreyfuss, supra
note 5, at 15 (describing episode where existence of International Trade Commission was deemed a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade merely because its procedures, although meeting American due process standards, were
different from those of other courts). According to one report, the "reasons reportedly given by the nominating panel-that [Justice Moore] was prone to injudicious
outbursts at attorneys and others from the bench-struck many as odd," Schmitt,
supra, at B2 (quoting Columbia Professor John Coffee: "if plaintiffs' attorneys were
making the choice, they would be somewhat happier with Carolyn Berger than
Andrew Moore"), and perhaps indicate the acidic nature of rumor and suspicion at
work. However, Justice Berger has been characterized as at least as pro-shareholder as was Justice Moore, even though they held opposite views on some corporate
law issues where Chancery and the supreme court differed. Id. (citing Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), rev'g, No. CIV.A.9041, 1991 WL 194725 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 26, 1991) and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985), rev'g, No. CIV.A.7997, 1985 WL 44691 (Del. Ch. May 13, 1985) as examples
of supreme court majorities included Justice Moore and which reversed Chancery
opinions written by then-Chancellor Berger).
Whatever the "real" story of the Moore-Berger switch, if nothing else, formerjustice Moore will be financially rewarded for his public pain. After leaving the
bench he joined the investment banking firm of Wasserstein Perella Group Inc. as
a senior managing director where he will likely be on both sides of takeover battles and better compensated than he was as a jurist. See Ex-Judge Joins
Wasserstein, supra. This raises red flags for scholars of specialized courts, If the
appointment decisions were politically motivated, it suggests that the interest
group fear of court organization theory is something more than mere academic
paranoia. Justice Moore was sacked from an arguably generalist court and replaced with a judge from a specialist court. This semi-specialization may explain
not only why the Moore-Berger switch was of such concern to the Wilmington
corporate bar but also suggests that vesting a court with general jurisdiction status does not magically make it any more immune from politics than a specialized
court. Perhaps interest group influence, if it really is a problem at all, is a casespecific problem unrelated to the architectural structure of the judiciary (or, for
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are at least as susceptible to political influence as specialist
courts, even though in theory specialist courts are more vulnerable.
Critics of specialization would argue, however, that Delaware provides an atypical example since Chancery is not narrowly specialized, and the Delaware Supreme Court is unlike
the sort of broadly generalized court as are the New York
Court of Appeals or the California Supreme Court, for example. Delaware is a small state (both in size and population) 2
whose business quite literally is business. Thus, much of the
Delaware Supreme Court's task involves reviewing the decisions of the Chancery Court."3 Consequently, the Supreme
Court has itself become semi-specialized through spending so
much of its time and energy reviewing appeals from Chancery.
This view is deficient in several respects. First, it assumes
that generalist courts are completely or largely free of similar
influences-a demonstrably false assumption. Much federal
political tension during the past quarter-century has involved
struggles to influence judicial appointments. Although this
tension is most pronounced at the Supreme Court level,"" it
occurred in battles over circuit court appointhas on occasion
5
ments.

0

that matter, the legislature).
1" Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 29-31.
11 According to a rough-hewn LEXIS search I conducted for this Article, it
appears that the supreme court has only reversed about 200 Chancery decisions
since 1951.
10 Compare MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING:
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989) with ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990), for two
dramatically different perspectives on Robert Bork's unsuccessful nomination to fill
the seat of retiring Justice Lewis Powell. See also Michael S. Paulsen, Is Lloyd
Bentsen Unconstitutional?,46 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1994) (referring to ideological and
political considerations in Reagan Administration decision to nominate Bork rather
than Senator Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah) to the seat).
10 Seventh Circuit Judge Daniel Manion, Third Circuit Judge H. Lee Sarokin,
and Eleventh Circuit Judge Rosemary Barkett being prominent examples. See
Ernie Freday, Washington in Brief, ATLANTA CONST., April 15, 1994, at C2
(Barkett challenged on the basis of her criticisms of application of the death penalty but confirmed by vote of 61-37); William Grady, After Trial by Fire, Judge
Acquits Himself Well, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1992, at 1 (Judge Manion challenged on
grounds of competence and excessive conservatism); Stephen Labaton, President's
Judicial Appointments: Diverse, But Well in the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
1994, at A15 (Sarokin confirmed but put to floor vote and "criticized for being soft
on crime").
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Interest group pressure undoubtedly has a constant but
silent impact on generalist judicial appointments. For example,
one observer, a long-time federal circuit judge, found evidence
of the substantial influence by interest groups in the fact that
the Clinton Administration primarily has appointed centrist
judges. °6 It remains uncertain, however, whether this situation will be any worse when the subject is a specialized court
opening rather than a generalist position.
In general, we do not yet know enough about interest
106 Stephen

Labaton, Clinton Judicial Choices Mostly In Mainstream, PATRIOT

LEDGER, Oct. 22, 1994, at 6.

Reagan and Bush really changed the philosophy of the courts, and not
for the better. Clinton had the opportunity to do the same, and he blew
it. There seems to be this sense that they don't want to do anything to
offend [Sen. Orrin] Hatch [R-Utahl or [Sen. Alan) Simpson [R-Wyo.]. You
can't conceive of Bush or Reagan thinking, "let's not do anything that
could offend Kennedy".
Id. (quoting Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt). Of course, the Clinton
administration's refusal to make judicial appointments with the intent of counteracting conservative appointments can be readily defended on the ground of doing
the right thing rather than attempting a liberal counter-offensive against the Reagan-Bush appointments. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT
ANNUAL REPORT: 1994, at 1 (1995) (liberal interest group concluding that Clinton

"appointments to the bench . . . have been outstanding in both quality and diversity" with Clinton appointing "a higher percentage of well-qualified nominees (as
rated by the American Bar Association) than either Presidents Reagan or Bush. In
addition, he had named an unprecedented number of women and minorities to the
courts."). However, the Alliance Report also notes that Clinton is under some pressure to make more conservative appointments to avoid confirmation battles in the
now Republican-controlled Senate. Id. at 1, 10.
I suspect that something other than good manners or naivetb prompted
Clinton to avoid possibly controversial liberal nominees to the bench. I also acknowledge the obvious possibility that the Clinton Administration might also have
consciously decided to lower the temperature of the judicial battles that have
plagued Washington and turned the name Bork into a verb (as in "borking" a
nominee). I generally applaud his depoliticization of the bench if that was his
conscious objective, even though I partially agree with Judge Reinhardt that some
restoration of balance is in order. Nonetheless, even if Clinton has had higher
motives in choosing centrists, there is no doubt that interest group politics remains a large part of the generalist judicial selection process. Senators Hatch and
Simpson have the power to make life difficult for Clinton nominees not only because of their positions on the Senate Judiciary Committee but also because they
represent and have the support of strong conservative political interests willing to
mobilize against judicial nominees perceived as too liberal. These groups can muster campaign contributions, attacks on candidates and legislators by talk radio
hosts, votes, letters, phone calls, faxes and (in some cases of pro-choice nominees)
even attacks from the pulpit. Without doubt, much of contemporary judicial selection and confirmation activity is not a pretty sight. See generally STEPHEN CARTER,
THE CONFIATION MESS (1994).
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group influence on different systems. However, nominations to
the bankruptcy court and the Federal Circuit have been no
more marred than generalist judicial selection by the self-interested participation of academics, the patent bar, the debtor
bar, the creditor bar, banks, other lenders, manufacturers and
ideologues generally. Just as market-based public choice theory
counsels caution, it also suggests that when a number of interests organize in opposition to one another, they tend to prevent
complete domination by any one faction. If nothing else, the
losing interest groups can reduce the possibility of capture by
turning judicial selection into a public process monitored by
the press. While "going public" to expose interest group shenanigans may appear effective in theory for dealing with higher visibility generalist courts, which the public recognizes, understands
and cares about, it fails in the real world of judicial
10 7
politics.
The standard public choice arguments about the dangers
of judicial specialization tend to overlook or minimize the power of the interest group during the formation of a specialized
tribunal. In general, public choice theory applies economic
concepts to predict or explain political behavior. The interest
group prong of public choice theory"'3 essentially argues that
legislators respond rationally to political stimuli in seeking to
maximize their "utility" of retaining office and power. Consequently, the average politician will attempt to accommodate
wealthy, powerful and organized political forces rather than to
vindicate a personal ideology or to further social policy or gen-

" The recent Delaware experience of Chancellor Berger's elevation to the Supreme Court at Justice Moore's expense attracted substantial press coverage. See
supra note 101. Although this attention may have resulted from the supreme
court's generalist stature, its tone reveals that the personnel change was newsworthy because of the Delaware courts' role as specialized corporate law courts. Perhaps other important specialized courts would have been viewed as too obscure for
press coverage under similar circumstances. Furthermore, the press coverage did
not change the fait accompli of replacing Justice Moore with Chancellor Berger.
Ultimately, this episode may just be an example of regrettable interest group influence.
"I3Public choice theory also has an "Arrow's Theorem" prong, which argues
based on the famous voting paradoxes found by Kenneth Arrow that electoral
outcomes often do not accurately represent aggregate preferences in an electorate,
including electorates of elites such as legislatures. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Cin.-KENT L REV.
123, 126 (1989).
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eral public sentiment.' °9 This tendency is especially pernicious where a significant interest group is currying favor on a
matter of low visibility to the public, making it unlikely that
the legislator who embraces the interest group will receive
negative press coverage or rebuke from the voters at large."0
Lower profile judicial appointments may thus be particularly
vulnerable to interest group pressure and efficacy unless competing interest groups (e.g., tort plaintiff counsel versus insurance defense counsel) cancel out one another and permit legislators to follow broad public sentiment or vote their own consciences. Judge Posner and other critics have suggested that
due to their reduced visibility and the acute scrutiny of special
interests, specialized court appointments are a legislative activity with greater vulnerability to interest group pressure
than are more broad-based and visible judicial appointments.
According to the public choice criticism, if specialized
courts are essentially booty ripe for plunder, the interest
groups who stand to benefit will work to establish such courts.
If these groups have sufficient clout to prompt legislatures to
create special courts, they undoubtedly must have great influence over the selection of generalist judges. While establishing
a special court may consolidate these groups' power or move its
exercise out of the public eye, any interest powerful enough to
create a new court is probably influential enough to get the
judges it wants on the existing generalist courts."'
To be sure, interest groups can invoke public-regarding
rationales to hoodwink legislators and the public into establishing special courts. Such rationales may even be accurate
and merely of incidental beneficit to the interest group's agenda. However, interest groups can use these same tactics to
promote a favored generalist appointee or to thwart a
"' See, e.g., MICHAEL HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS (1981); THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971); Gary Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
"o See KAY SCHOLZMAN & JAMES TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERI-

CAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
I Once again, the Moore-Berger switch in Delaware, if it was in any way a
negative event, was an event affecting the composition of the more generalist court
rather than the specialized court.
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disfavored nominee. In 1990s Washington, for example, special
interests have used issues such as payment of taxes for child
care providers, past marijuana use or marital problems to stop
generalist judicial nominations before resorting to ideological
attack. This environment, which is replicated at least to some
degree in state systems, illustrates how exaggerated claims are
about specialized courts' greater vulnerability ."
Another variant of the public-choice attack on specialized
courts focuses on strong or irreconcilable divisions among even
the established elite of the profession rather than on specialized courts as an institution. Judge Posner provides an obvious
example of this point by suggesting that a constitutional law
specialized court would be a disaster because of inherent political divisions in the field today, finding such a specialized bench
unthinkable because "[iut would be like asking specialists in
political science to govern us.".. According to Posner:
A "camp" is more likely to gain the upper hand in a specialized court

than in the entire federal court system or even in one circuit. This is
not only because appointments to the specialized court would inevi-

tably be made from the camps, but also because experts are more
sensitive to the swings in professional opinion than an outsider, a

generalist, would be.... A turn of the political wheel would bring
another of the warring camps into temporary command. There
would be rapid vacillation between extremes, rather than the glacial
of policy change in the federal courts of apshifts characteristic
1 14
peals...

Posner's thesis, though beguiling, is overstated and perhaps even incorrect. The "warring camp" or "polarization"
problems affect generalist benches as well. For example D.C.
Circuit Judge Lawrence Silberman allegedly threatened former
judge (and current White House counsel) Abner Mikva with
The essential absence of state data on judicial selection politics is but another example of the tendency of this debate to proceed based on argument and
thought experiments rather than field research and empirical information. However, my own experience working in and lobbying before a state legislature (Minnesota), suggest that state interest group politics largely mimic the federal scene.
11

1"

Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 780. Judge Posner also

makes this point in imagining an antitrust court split between three warring
camps of jurists from the "noneconomic school," the Harvard economic school
(which is more "prone to find monopolitistic practices") and the Chicago School
("which believes the same practices to be for the most part procompetitive'). Id. at
781.
114 Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 781-82.
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Moreover, while generalist judges may not be

complete captives of their own ideology, certainly it correlates
with general decisional patterns."' For example, Democratic
appointees generally are more inclined to side with labor unions, consumers, minorities, civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants, while Republican appointees generally favor management, businesses, civil defendants and government prosecutors." 7 Consequently, the ideological battles between interest
groups will not differ dramatically in the generalist arena from
the more honed battles over specialized tribunals.
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Posner correctly
describes the tendency of specialists to succumb to intellectual
fads. A generalist seems more likely to be influenced by trends
and fads since she has less expertise to apply in examining a
trend. The real hard-core expert is unlikely to change his or
her stripes upon the onset of a popular new view. For example,
no matter how popular liberal economics may become, Posner
is unlikely to make the next edition of Economic Analysis of
Law sound like the work of liberal economist John Kenneth
Galbraith"' or Judge Guido Calabresi."'
If anything, an expert who has invested years of education, expenditure, professional effort and personal pride in
adopting and promoting a particular perspective on a specialty
seems less likely to alter his or her views than does a learned
but less committed lawyer. The latter are more likely to hop on
the next intellectual train because they are less grounded in a
different view than are experts. 2 '

.1.See Neil A. Lewis, Presiding as Ideals Clash in Capital Appeals Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at B4.
116 See Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by Pres.
ident Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993).
117

Id.

"' See, e.g., JOHN K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973);

JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958).
I"' See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
120 A closer look strictly at Posner's examples of antitrust and constitutional law
casts even greater doubt on his assumption about the malleability of judges' opinions. Clearly, liberal, "noneconomic" antitrust scholars such as Robert Pitovsky and
Eleanor Fox have not drifted rightward with the body politic or academic fashion.
See Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (1986); Robert Pitofsky, The
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979). I do not mean to
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Special courts might, in fact, resist change if they are
populated by experts frozen in the paradigm that dominated
their subject matter one or more generations ago (for instance,
when they attended law school, made partner or wrote their
tenure pieces). This problem may be less severe than the malleability posited by Posner because it is more susceptible to
legislative correction.
Thus, specialists are probably not more volatile than generalists. Posner also suggests that specialists are more polarized and that shifting appointments will bring shifting doctrine. Again, I raise the comparative question. Loodng, for
example, at the current supreme court one can see no shortage
of polarization among these generalists. Ultimately, the accuracy of the Posnerian perspective on interest group dangers
arising from court specialization may depend upon the subject
matter jurisdiction of the specialized courts. Wise selection of
the topics committed to specialized courts remains the best
means of avoiding or minimizing the danger of interest group
dominance.121
D. Independence
Some scholars have concluded that specialized courts reflect the views of current agencies and legislatures rather than
those of the legislatures that established the statutes at issue. m This argument may describe agencies' actions fairly
suggest that scholars like Pitovsky and Fox are oblivious to economic analysis nor
opposed to it. Rather, they are two authorities largely identified as opposed to the
Chicago School and apart from the purported Harvard School identified by Posner,
which tend to see antitrust policy as implicating more than merely market prices.
Since Posner's article does not footnote his assertions on this topic, however, I am
left to speculate somewhat on which scholars belong in which camps. Similarly,
Chicago School antitrust theorists like Posner and his colleague Frank Easterbrook
are unlikely to join the Pitofsky-Fox camp if more liberal analysis counseling government intervention comes into vogue. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). Finally, Philip Areeda and
other Harvard School adherents are not expected to blow with the fashions of
politics and academia. See, e.g., Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 697, 699 (1975).
2 See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text. A proposed blueprint for
further experimentation with specialized courts is presented infra part IV.
m See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 2, at 1144-47.
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accurately since they tend to follow the policy of the incumbent
administration or legislature.'2 3 It does not follow that specialized courts are subject to the same weakness in the face of
political pressure, however. If given the same job security, support and status of generalist judges, specialist judges can display equivalent independence, even in the face of powerful
political forces.
The available evidence suggests that specialization does
not undermine judicial independence. As Dreyfuss illustrates,
Delaware Chancery, although widely praised as being sensitive
to business realities, is neither a legislative puppet nor an
interest group foil. Similarly the federal bankruptcy courts,
although not given full Article III protections, are as indepenI's

In contrast to the independence of specialized courts, I should emphasize

that I do not consider administrative law tribunals to constitute specialized courts.
No matter how competent, these judges remain largely glorified administrative
hearing officers. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
17.11-17.17 (2d ed. 1978) (describing organization of administrative law judge
corps). They are not a separate judicial entity so much as an adjudicatory arm of
the executive branch. We should not be surprised then, if administrative law judges show less independence than courts. The "nonacquiescence" controversy surrounding denials of social security disability benefits during the Reagan Administration serves to illustrate the agency-court distinction. See Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE
L.J. 679 (1989) (defending Administration practice as means of seeking valid national policy objectives). Most of the Social Security Agency positions disapproved
by the federal courts had been accepted by the administrative law judges assigned
to review disability claims.
The Social Security Nonacquiescence Affair of the 1980s also serves to remind
us that agency adjudicators have something of a credibility problem in that the
public is quick to perceive unfairness from unpopular agency decisions and to give
more independent courts the benefit of the doubt. As Dreyfuss and others remind
us, my posited truth, even if correct today (most of the time), is hardly universal.
For example, the Commerce Court was criticized and eventually abandoned in part
because it restrained the popular Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). See
Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329,
335 (1991); George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 238 (1964). But part of the Commerce
Court's problem was frequent reversal by the Supreme Court. See Dreyfuss, supra
note 4, at 12. Had the Commerce Court not been trumped by another respected
court, it might have been able to weather its disagreements with the ICC. During
the height of the nonacquiescence controversy, the bulk of press coverage expressly
or implicitly praised the courts and painted the Administration as both stingy and
unprincipled. See, e.g., Robert J. Axelrod, Comment, The Politics of Non-Acquiescence-The Legacy of Steiberger v. Sullivan, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 765 (1994) (advocating special Article III court for Social Security claims); Ann Reubens, Note,
Social Security Administration in Crisis: Non-Acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52
BROOK. L. REV. 85 (1986).
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dent of the President and Congress as are the district and
circuit courts.' Although some have argued that the Federal
Circuit's tax jurisprudence favors the government," there is
no hard evidence to sustain this claim.' In addition, the
Federal Circuit is not particularly specialized in the tax area
since so much tax jurisprudence also emanates from the other
circuit courts. Clearly, simply because the Federal Circuit
differs from the Sixth Circuit for example, this itself does not
indicate error or lack of independence by the Federal Circuit,
even if the government tends to win more cases inthe forum.
E. PublicAcceptance and Perceptionsof Fairness
As Professor Dreyfuss reminds us, tribunals must be perceived as fair in order to adjudicate effectively and even to
survive. To be accepted as courts, tribunals-whether specialized or generalist-must look and act like courts. That means
they need indicia of independence such as separate status from
agencies or particular programs, job security, adequate support
and respect from the other branches, open proceedings, established procedure, and the attention to detail and commitment
to adjudicatory values traditionally found in full-fledged courts.
As Dreyfuss notes, even the most established and sensible
procedures risk being perceived as unfair when they differ
from the "normal" procedures used in the generalist tribunals."
F. GeographicDiversity
Much of the literature assumes that specialized courts
would be designed like the Federal Circuit and its components
and would be located largely in one city or at least have less
geographic diversity than the generalist courts. As Judge Gibbons reminds us, however, the federal bankruptcy courts provide an example of effective specialized courts that are dispersed widely throughout the nation.' 3 Proponents of special12

See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 47.

See, eg., Bruff, supra note 123, at 336-37 (citing authorities).
See Bruf, supra note 124, at 336-37.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 15.
See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 47.
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ized courts often point out the possibility of decentralized location and even endorse some "circuit riding" to those areas that
do not generate enough litigation to warrant a permanent
court."2 9 Consequently, this criticism of specialized courts
may be unwarranted, As Dreyfuss points out, geographic decentralization also may be unnecessary and wasteful for courts
whose subject matter involves parties who easily can afford
travel expenses. Obviously, since specialized courts devoted to
small stakes matters affecting the general populace would be
untenable if located only in Washington, New York or Los
Angeles, this sort of court can efficiently have chambers
throughout the country.
G. Boundary Disputes
The border disputes posited by critics of specialized courts
pose more genuine and less tractable problems for specialization. Here, again, Dreyfuss's work is instructive and tends to
buttress the criticism. Delaware Chancery is successful in part
because it is fairly clear what matters lie within its jurisdiction. The equitable notion of the "clean-up doctrine," 30 which
allows the court to adjudicate the entirety of a case brought
before it, permits Chancery to resolve the entire case with
finality and clarity. 3 ' In contrast, Dreyfuss's major criticism
of the Federal Circuit is that it lacks exclusive jurisdiction over
patents as well as power
to resolve competition disputes be32
tween patent litigants.
Solving the boundary disputes of the Federal Circuit or of
a hypothetical commercial court will not be particularly easy.
Although one can argue that bright lines may provide the
certainty needed to prevent forum shopping and inefficient
adjudication, this seems too facile an answer. A bright line rule
may create problems of arbitrariness and surely will be manipulated by clever litigants. In addition, the natural inclination

"2 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying
the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989).
130 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (5th ed. 1994)

(describing equity practice of adjudicating the entire dispute once a portion of it
had been presented to the equity court for determination).
.3.See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 6-8.
13 See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 34.
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when trying to solve questions of jurisdictional boundaries is to
opt for wider boundaries, as Dreyfuss does in suggesting
changes in the Federal Circuit.' But this approach, even if
the correct one, is more likely to create problems of both application and politics. A specialist court with a wide swath of authority is more likely to come into conflict with generalist authority. In addition, wide specialist authority will engender
political opposition not only from those ordinarily leery of specialization, but also from interests that consider the specialized
forum a disadvantage for their disputes.
These sorts of problems, however significant, are not deadly to the concept of specialization. The American federal system has created tensions between federal and state court authority for more than 200 years' but these tensions have
been adequately managed. The body politic implicitly has concluded that the benefits of the federal-state division of labor
outweigh its costs. Although boundary fixing and enforcement
present a challenge, they do not make generalist courts inevitable.
H. Judicial Flexibility for the Future
The remaining major objection to specialization is that it
freezes the allocation of judicial resources, making it difficult
to adapt to changes in the system's caseload and needs. This
criticism unrealistically conceives of specialized courts as a
cadre of Article HI judges with narrow and exclusive jurisdiction that can never be altered no matter how slow the trickle
of future cases.
Such a construct would not last forever. Even Article HI
judges eventually retire, die or even leave the bench to avoid
boredom. Realistically, the hypothetical grave mistake would
have worked itself out of the system by now. Furthermore, in
the real world, there are limits to the mistakes even our occasionally befuddled political system may make. By the time the
forces of status quo inertia have been overcome and a specialized court established, it is likely that the need for adjudicat-

I3Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 37.
lu See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 67

ing the cases assigned to the specialized court is real, largely
permanent and widely accepted.13
Specialized courts can be structured to remain flexible
while still retaining their status. For example, the long tenure
(ten years in the case of bankruptcy judges) and salary protection Article I judges enjoy, although not the security provided
in Article III, is a far cry from at-will employment. Furthermore, the specialist judge becomes an expert not only in judging and critical thinking, but also acquires substantive
knowledge and refined technical expertise. Thus, a bankruptcy
judge who is denied reappointment through the efforts of the
creditors' bar would have the skills and expertise that private
firms and other branches of government would value. The system thus achieves a respectable quantum of independence but
avoids a lifetime commitment to the judge should the caseload
decline.
Other variants of specialization have yet to be explored.
For example, specialized courts could offer "specialized tenure"
for judges.'3 6 The "catch" in the institution's grant of tenure

"' One example of this process is the bankruptcy imbroglio occasioned by the
Northern Pipeline decision. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding portion of Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional insofar as it permitted Article I bankruptcy judges to enter final determinations of state law claims heard in connection with the bankruptcy). The controversy concerned whether to cure the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act by
making bankruptcy judges Article III judges.
The decision to preserve Article I status for the bankruptcy judges and to
have their determinations on non-core bankruptcy matters function as mere reports
and recommendations to the district court was motivated by the fear that a large
group of bankruptcy judges might become underemployed if bankruptcy filings
decreased markedly in the future. Although the decision to opt for continued Article I treatment may have been correct, the number of bankruptcy filings has not
diminished and appears unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Bankruptcy,
like breached contracts, personal injury and employment litigation, appears to be a
perennial part of the American legal landscape.
13 This would be much like the specialized tenure provided in law schools to
faculty affiliated with certain programs, usually particular clinical or lawyering
skills/legal writing offerings, which can theoretically be eliminated through curriculum change. In the real world (if law schools can be so deemed), this seldom happens. One reason, of course, is the typical human tendency to want to retain valued colleagues no matter what the vagaries of fate. Law schools typically would
find something meaningful for talented specialized tenure faculty rather than potentially end a career. But the more prominent reason these arrangements usually
work out is that most clinical/lawyeringlegal writing programs endure in substantially consistent form through the years.
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to these faculty members is the possibility that the position
would dissolve if the program is eradicated. Since the specialized court is likely to endure once established, such tenure
would offer a degree of certainty.
Frequently, the specialized court is created and maintained because a long-standing body of cases simply has been
carved out of the generalist case load. In addition, as previously noted, the specialized courts of the real world tend to be
semi-specialized courts." 7 Consequently, they are not at the
mercy of any single legal or demographic trend. For example,
the Federal Circuit may experience an increase in government
litigation, even if the number of patent cases declines. In short,
the concerns about a lack of flexibility seem overstated. A less
drastic solution would be to appoint Article II specialist judges
with the express understanding that they can be assigned different cases as needed in the interests of justice. New specialized judges even could be required to relocate chambers or
refine their caseloads to avoid obsolescence.
In sum, then, those who have opposed specialization have
protested too much. The question remains, however, whether
despite those overstatements there remain unscalable barriers
to establishing specialized commercial courts in the future. We
must question whether a particular model of specialization is
most likely to be successful for commercial disputes or other
subsets of the litigation caseload.
IV. A MODEL FOR LIMITED SPECIALIZATION: SUBJECTING
SPECIALIST TRIAL COURTS TO GENERALIST JUDICIAL
REVIEW-TRYING TO FIND A FORMULA
Despite the controversy surrounding specialization, the
legal community remains receptive to further experiments in
specialized courts in limited circumstances. Reviewing the body
of commentary about specialized courts, including the new and
important contribution Professor Dreyfuss makes in this Symposium, suggests some specific guidelines for future experiments with a division of labor among courts. Any reform proposal that resembles a hard-and-fast formula for specialization,
however, is of questionable value. The history of judicial re-

37

See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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form demonstrates that formulaic approaches generally are
inappropriate.
The substantial body of work contributed by Dreyfuss
presents a more balanced and nuanced approach which suggests that targeted and partial specialization efforts indeed
may provide useful judicial reform.138 Her work similarly cautions against faddish, feverish or shoot-from-the-hip specialization. Her contribution to this Symposium, for example, is convincing in its views that the Pennsylvania initiatives she discusses are not likely to prove fruitful,'39 and that wholesale
specialization of commercial matters generally is unwise. "
All told, however, Dreyfuss's scholarship suggests that specialization-or at least the semi-specialization of courts like the
Federal Circuit and Delaware Chancery-generally has succeeded and certainly has not been the disaster its critics predicted.'
In addition, Dreyfuss and others have chronicled
the increasing attractiveness of specialization as a possible
solution to the pressures of ever-increasing caseloads. In short,
her work suggests that some form of specialization is indeed
here to stay both because it can work and because it has politico-social support. If specialization actually has arrived, the justice system must make the most effective use of it with a number of caveats.
A. Specialize at the Trial Level
Specialization has the potential to offer greater speed and
efficiency, as well as greater predictability and uniformity of
decisions. Specialization can best accomplish these goals at the
1"8See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 4; Dreyfuss, supra note 5; Dreyfuss, supra

note 11.
139 See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 24-31 (noting particular problems in proposed
legislation, problems of the Pennsylvania judiciary, and historical advantages of
Delaware not possessed by Pennsylvania).
1" See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 33 (suggesting that specialized commercial
courts may result in decisions less favorable to consumers and may not yield posited operating efficiencies).
141 I want to be clear that I am persuaded that Dreyfuss's work suggests that
semi-specialization (multiple subject matter responsibilities) may make courts more
effective but that this does not support what I consider incomplete specialization
(incomplete doctrinal control over the specialty area), which Dreyfuss's work suggests undermines the specialization experiment. See infra text accompanying notes
4-11 for a further discussion of the distinction and my assessment.
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trial court level. Despite the large increase in appeals during
the past thirty years (particularly in the federal system), most
adjudication in America takes place in pre-trial proceedings
and at the trial court level. This is where litigants and lawyers
invest the most resources, and where cases lie longest awaiting
disposition.'42 If specialization is to have a significant impact,
it logically should be applied at the trial stage before being imposed upon the appellate process.
Specialist judges are most likely to be able to achieve some
of the efficiencies of specialization at the trial level. Although
the shift toward managerial judging has been and remains a
topic of considerable debate, trial level adjudication now entails a good deal of case management. 43 Specialist judges
may be better, more efficient managers and may offer case
processing decisions that intrude less upon litigants' substantive rights. Case management involves setting and enforcing
pretrial preparation deadlines, supervising disclosure and
discovery, ruling on summary judgment and other dispositive
motions, and brokering settlement. A trial judge with specialized expertise would have more of an intrinsic "feel" for performing these tasks correctly, and would need less fresh research and reflection than would a generalist. Consequently, a
specialist judge might well preside over case processing that is
faster, less costly (in both judicial and attorney time), and
more frequently correct.
Furthermore, many of a trial judge's decisions are invariably (and perhaps unavoidably) made extemporaneously, with
comparatively little time for research, consultation, reflection
and written articulation. Trial judges have frequent face-toface interaction with lawyers, litigants, jurors and the public.
Often they must rule orally, largely on the basis of their accumulated knowledge and judgment, rather than after painstaking study of briefs, case law or policy considerations. More
than appellate judges, then, trial judges employ specialized expertise when setting deadlines, ruling on whether a witness

1-

See ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRiAL LrIGATION 624

(3d ed. 1994) (most litigation in society is pretrial litigation since comparatively

few disputes are prosecuted completely through full trial adjudication and review).
143 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
659, 730-37 (1993).
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must answer at deposition or trial, or determining whether to
berate a lawyer for an inappropriate settlement position. Appellate courts simply have less need for specialized expertise
and less opportunity to use it since most appellate judges will
have time to "go to the books" in deciding such matters.
Perhaps most valuable will be the specialist trial judge's
deep familiarity with a range of disputes involving the specialty topic. Although specialist judges possibly will become jaded
or close-minded, the fact that the topic is familiar means the
specialist trial judge will be able to grasp immediately the legal concept at issue as well as the nature of the factual controversy. The specialist trial judge will be superior to the generalists in her ability to focus more quickly on the important factual issues and to apply the law with sensitivity in light of the
court's institutional memory. Finally, the specialist bench will
recognize quickly how a single case disposition fits in with the
fabric of the substantive area.
Successful experiments in specialization require a focus on
the trial court level, as well as other important factors discussed below. For example, the judge must have been screened
and selected for competence, she must have adequate job security, the court must have adequate facilities and resources, and
the bar must not be demonstrably lower in quality than the
bar at large. If these support, infrastructure and prestige factors are held relatively constant, specialized trial courts discharging their responsibilities are likely to achieve economies
of scale in case disposition. For example, specialists would be
better equipped to efficiently give jury instructions, rule on
recurring matters, and write expeditious findings of fact and
conclusions of law or opinions on motions, to address common
issues in the specialized court.'"
B. Provide GeneralistReview
Ironically, another advantage of focusing specialization
efforts on the trial court level is that appellate review can
I" I note that in virtually all cases of the Delaware Supreme Court reversing
the Chancery Court, the reviewing court took no issue with the trial court's factfinding.
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correct or minimize any errors they make. As a check on the
possible detriments of specialization, however, the reviewing
courts should be comprised of generalist judges. This serves
several purposes.
First, it acts as a pragmatic compromise to permit specialization while retaining the generalist control that can defuse
critics and make continued specialization efforts politically
palatable. Second, generalist review operates as a combined
attempt at portfolio diversification and quality control. If, as
specialization's critics contend (erroneously in my view), specialist judges will intrinsically have lower prestige, less interesting work, and hence lower caliber judging skills, the more
prestigious generalist appellate bench would rescue the legal
system from the predicted substandard work of the specialist
bench. Furthermore, appellate review by generalists maintains
efficiency while also permitting the type of percolation, crossfertilization and broader perspective that critics feel may be
missing from specialized adjudication.
As noted above, the appellate process also provides more
time for the court to derive expertise from the efforts of the
trial court, counsel and the litigants by digesting appellate
briefs, researching the issues in the comparative comfort of
chambers, exchanging impressions with colleagues, and taking
the time to think though issues before rendering decisions.
Even though appellate courts may be asked to rule quickly on
emergency matters, trial courts face at least as many emergency matters. During such times, the streamlined decisionmaking
ability of specialist judges would seem most valuable at the
trial court level. Consequently, the best way for the legal system to hedge is through trial court specialization supervised by
generalist appellate review.
1. Reservations About Rotation as a Form of Specialization
The proposal for generalist courts to operate in rotating
panels also bears on judicial recruitment and performance. It
also potentially poses problems of politicization of the bench.
Professor Daniel Meador has championed the rotating panel
concept for more than a decade.145 Under this proposal, pat1" Meador, supra note 129; Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and
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terned after the assignment system prevailing in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 14 6 appellate courts would sit in fixed
panels with particular jurisdictional assignments but judges
would rotate gradually through the various panels.1 7 The
theory of the rotation is to permit judges to develop an advanced and efficient "learning curve" through sustained focus
on a particular mix of cases while alleviating boredom and
isolation by eventually rotating judges into a different mix of
cases. Each panel would have a restricted field of jurisdiction
but would not be highly specialized.'
For example, one division would hear one-third of the general civil docket as well as
immigration appeals, bankruptcy appeals and Tax Court appeals, while another division would hear civil rights cases in
49
which the U.S. government is a party.
Although Meador's proposal has a good deal of merit, it is
not as attractive as more targeted specialization at the trial
level. First, the rotating panel forces at least temporary specialization even in situations where there is no basis to believe
it would be helpful since matters may be obtaining acceptable
processing under a generalist system. Simultaneously, the
rotating judges are precluded from reaping the full benefits of
specialization since they cannot remain focused on the area
they most prefer and cannot continue to apply their expertise
beyond the five-year rotations suggested by Meador.5 0 Furthermore, the Meador proposal seems to lack a well-designed
subplan regarding the use of senior circuit judges. Currently,
senior judges provide valuable judicial aid by sitting on "regular" generalist panels with great frequency. Under a rotation

a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983)
[hereinafter Meador, Appellate Court Dilemma]; Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Sub.
ject Matter Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1981) [hereinafter Meador, German Design];
Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation,Malfunction, and a Proposed
Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617 [hereinafter Meador, Federal Judiciary].
Meador is not alone. See, e.g., Stuart S. Nagel, Systematic Assignment of Judges:
A Proposal, 70 JUDICATURE 73 (1986).
"' Meador, German Design, supra note 145, at 31-41.
"
Meador, Appellate Court Dilemma, supra note 145, at 475.
148 For example, Meador's proposal for the Ninth Circuit suggested five divisions, each with at least two areas of specialty. Meador, Appellate Court Dilemma,
supra note 145, at 477-78.
'o
Meador, Appellate Dilemma, supra note 145, at 489-90.
's
See Meador, Appellate Dilemma, supra note 145, at 483-85.
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system, it is unclear whether senior judges could be broadly
involved in the bulk of circuit court cases. Finally, the rotation
system fails to account for the primacy effect and ideological
differences separating the court's judges over particular issues.
The primacy effect refers to the tendency of the first court decisions to establish lasting rules of law and approaches toward
particular cases. As any participant in committee work or joint
authorship is aware, the first draft tends to shape the ultimate
disposition of the matter, absent anything short of a complete
shredding by subsequent participants in the processY '1 In
on any issue tends to be influother words, the first statement
15 2
ential and determinative.
Thus, the first of Meador's suggested rotating judicial
panels would have inordinate influence over the shape of the
law upon which it adjudicates. Although the proposed rotating
divisions would of course come after one hundred years of a
generalist regime, and would presumably accent the
precedential work of the generalist panels, judges will become
more influential as they are given concentrated decisionmaking
powers on specific areas of law.' For instance, the first rotation division, being specialized, may obtain both the normal
"first drafter's influence" as well as an aura of expertise. Thus,
in a judicial version of Arrow's Theorem, it may set the parameters for any future debate.
This influence may not be particularly problematic in
many areas of law since, notwithstanding the collapse of much
law's academic consensus, most cases will have the same outcome irrespective of the adjudicator. In addition, Meador's
proposal would still preserve regional circuit courts. Thus, an
" This shredding occurs only if these participants violently disagree with the
primary author and can either (a) articulate objectively persuasive support for
their position or b) muster overwhelming subjective opposition to the primary
author's position within the organization.
See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 42, at 68 ("the writer of the first
1'
draft usually controls to a great extent the final product").
" Even in generalist courts, precedent often is overturned or marginalized
eventually. For example, when created in 1981, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the

sensible approach of using applicable Fifth Circuit precedent as its starting point
for analysis. Within a decade, distinctive differences had emerged between the two

circuit courts. Compare Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (Rule 11 sanctions should be determined according to "least severe
sanction" approach) with Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991) (implicitly rejecting least severe sanction approach).
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odd primacy effect in one circuit would likely be counteracted
by the results in other circuits. Over time, the more persuasive
view would probably win out either through Supreme Court
certiorari review or by changes in subsequent rotation panels
in the circuits of the weaker jurisprudence. In the meantime,
of course, certain litigants would suffer (no matter how carefully crafted the ultimate rules of retroactivity and prospectivity),
as inevitably they suffer from mistakes made under the current system.
Of greater concern is the possibility that the initial rotation panels or circuit court divisions might sculpt a particular
area of law that is problematic but unlikely to be rectified
easily or quickly because of the inherent ideological divergence
of judges over the issue. Civil rights cases, which would fall
under one rotation panel in the Meador system, are a particularly likely candidate for such controversy, division and potential unfairness.154 The range of receptivity and opposition
judges exhibit to such cases usually correlates with their own
social and political views. Judges will adjudicate such claims
differently, even in the appellate mode of reviewing another
tribunal's assessment of factual disputes, causation, damages
and the like. If the first rotation panel randomly contains a
strong and cohesive group of liberals or conservatives, however, it will have substantial power to make enduring civil
rights law, especially when interpreting a newly enacted or
amended statute. Subsequent panel judges may disagree, but
the combination of five years' precedent and the aura of specialized expertise is likely to make the early rotation panel
precedents particularly difficult to dislodge.
Of course, judicial variance is omnipresent and undermines many aspects of the legal system.'55 Domination by a
14 Although Meador does not specify, he allocates cases to his proposed divi-

sions according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts data, which treats
employment discrimination cases as part of the civil rights docket. See Meador,
Federal Judiciary, supra note 145, at 645-47. Like constitutional and general civil
rights issues, employment discrimination issues are often fractious and value-laden
in the legal community. Consequently, a general civil rotation panel ruling on
these sorts of cases would present the same dangers I foresee for civil rights rotation panels.
" Let me illustrate this by discussing a circuit outside the situs of this Symposium. Imagine that the Seventh Circuit adopts Meador's system and that the first
rotation panel assigned to civil rights cases includes Judges Richard Coffey, Frank
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particular political viewpoint already occurs today in generalist
courts.'56 It is plausible, however, that specialization may exacerbate the strength of certain ideological legal perspectives
irrespective of their support in the profession at large. No
wonder many commentators, including Judge Posner and Prof.
Dreyfuss, have argued that the more ideologically infused
areas of law (such as constitutional law) should remain subject
to a generalized system of appellate review.' 7 According to
Posner, "[iut is a fact, perhaps an unhappy fact, that many
areas of our law-I venture to suggest most of them-have a
strong ideological cast."'58 For example, he sees antitrust theorists "divided today into three warring camps": socio-political;
Harvard economic, which is more likely to deem certain practices in violation of the law; and Chicago economic, which is

Easterbrook, Daniel Manion, Harlington Wood and (of course) Chief Judge Richard
Posner. (Assume that, notwithstanding his opposition to specialized adjudication,
Posner does not resign from the bench.) This panel would encompass a distinctly
conservative subgroup of the court, particularly on employment discrimination and
civil rights matters. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seuenth Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673 (1994) (reviewing reported opinions of judges and sampling lawyer impressions of the judges). In five years, notwithstanding annual one-member rotations, it would likely
produce a body of law that was distinctly pro-employer, pro-government and prodefendant. Other judges of the courts-such as liberals Richard Cudahy and Illana
Diamond Rovner, as well as moderates like Kenneth Ripple-might differ with the
precedents but probably would be ineffective at reversing the tide.
" For example, the Seventh Circuit is generally regarded as more conservative
today than 15 years ago and much of the credit (or blame) is assigned to Posner
and Easterbrook due to their intellectual force and high volume of quickly written,
influential opinions.
15 See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 414-18.
Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 780. Judge Posner continued:
To say, for example, that Laurence Tribe or John Ely is a 'specialist in
constitutional law has rather a special meaning. They are specialists in
the sense that they know constitutional law much better than most scholars or practitioners. But very few people, even among those who take
seriously the idea of dividing the Supreme Court into a constitutional
and a nonconstitutional branch, would also want to fill the constitutional
branch with people like Tribe and Ely because they are specialists in
constitutional law. It would be like asking specialists in political science
to govern us. We think of a specialist not just as someone who knows a
lot about a subject, but as someone to whom we are willing to entrust
important decisions about it that affect us. This willingness depends on a
belief that the specialist is objective, in the sense that his judgment is
independent of personal values that we may not share, and that is not a
sense that most people have about experts in constitutional law.
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more likely to see the same practices as pro-competitive. 5 ' In
addition, some fields such as social security disability law show
a vast gulf between those who emphasize the humane and remedial
objects of the law and those who are worried about fostering dependency and depleting the federal budget. These fields are divided over
questions of value. Such questions cannot be answered by consulting
an expert observer, neutrally deploying his value-free knowledge.
That is why we call them questions of value rather than of fact. 6 '

Although these dangers are more pronounced for hard-core
specialized courts than for the rotation panels envisioned by
Meador, his proposal does not come close to eliminating the
problem. The Meador proposal retains much of the inefficiency
of the current system because it not only fails to reap the full
purported benefits of specialization, but also increases the
danger of partisanship that purportedly accompanies a specialized judiciary.
2. Remaining Independent While Retaining Flexibility
Regardless of whether the critics or proponents of specialization are correct, specialized courts will work best if they are
not granted second-class status. Insofar as possible, specialized
courts should have parity with the generalist bench. To fairly
test the merits of specialization, the specialized court must
have similar resources: adequate physical facilities; decent
libraries; similar support staff, law clerks or substitute professionals; and modern equipment.
It is vital that further experiments with specialization
seek judges equal in ability to the system's generalist judges.
Obviously, specialist courts cannot offer a full generalist menu
of cases to attract high quality specialist judges. If the criticisms of Posner and others are correct, the specialist bench will
always be somewhat less attractive and consequently probably
less intellectually vigorous. To minimize this distinction, specialized courts should have all the benefits available to
generalist judges: life tenure or similar job security; protection
against salary diminution; equivalent salary and fringe benefits; and similar opportunity for interesting changes of

...Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 781.
1" Posner, Essay on Delegation, supra note 42, at 782.
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workpace (e.g., sitting by designation on appellate panels,
attendance at judicial conferences, participation in rulemaking
and other policymaking efforts of the judiciary).
Insofar as it can be institutionalized, specialized courts
must have comparable prestige. Policymakers creating specialized courts and appointing specialist judges should not use
demeaning rhetoric that suggests the shunting off of a high
volume of boring or unimportant but pesky matters. If a negative attitude to specialized courts is compounded by lower
salaries, less job security and logistical disadvantages, the specialized court's second-tier status will be quickly secured.
When, for example, Justice Antonin Scalia speaks or writes of
the need to limit the jurisdiction of the Article III federal
bench to only the most important matters facing the federal
judiciary 6 ' this view characterizes certain matters as lower
in prestige, less challenging and largely "unworthy" of
America's best legal-judicial talentL This view only discour-

...See, e.g., Gary A. Hengstler, Scalia Seeks Court Changes, A.BA. J., Apr. 1,
1987, at 20.
*" Justice Scalia has been the most vocal of those arguing for stripping federal
jurisdiction of "less worthy" matter, but these views seem at least partially accepted by those who call for limits on the size of the Article I judiciary in order to
JUDITMTYE
preserve its "special" status. See, eg., FEDERAL COURT STUDY CO
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COUMRS STUDY
COMMITTEE 38-53 (1990) (recommending elimination of some forms of federal jurisdiction, including diversity); Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-the Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993) (arguing that larger size of
generalist federal bench bureaucratizes elite federal bench).
The view of Federal Courts Study Committee strikes me as less pernicious for
specialized tribunals in that the Committee's articulated basis for the recommendation emphasizes the proper allocation of state-federal authority and suggests that
state courts are indeed amply competent to decide certain matters of importance.
By comparison, Justice Scalia's comments give one the impression that he simply
thinks federal judges should not have their hands sullied by the pedestrian matters of state tort law or issues affecting individuals rather than institutions. See
Hengstler, supra note 163, at 54 (decrying alleged deterioration of 'system of elite
federal courts").
The call of Judge Jon Newman and others (including the Federal Courts
Study Committee) for a limited generalist federal bench is related to this but
different in that it fosters an unhealthy status distinction between the "real'
generalist federal bench and all other courts, including specialist courts, which
Judge Jon Newman implicitly dismisses as mere bureaucracies (one can almost
envision the Max Weber and Franz Kafka caricatures at work, meting out inferior
justice). However, the Newman position provides some support for specialization of
judicial function. If Newman is correct that a limited bench is necessary for cohesiveness, coherence and quality, then perhaps both state and federal systems are
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ages talented lawyers with any semblance of ego from accepting judicial positions on anything other than an Article III
generalist bench. Little purpose is served by creating and fostering a climate in which specialized tribunals are regarded as
inferior in general, rather than merely inferior in the technical
sense of being subject to appellate review.
The question remains whether adequate stature can be
bestowed upon specialized courts without making them Article
III courts. For reasons set forth earlier in this Article, although
a strong political resistance to the establishment of specialized
Article III courts may exist, the fears of Article III specialist
appointment appear overstated."6 For example, even in the
midst of a constitutional crisis in the 1980s, Congress was
unwilling to convert the bankruptcy courts from Article I to
Article III status." At essentially the same time, however,
Congress did create the Article III Federal Circuit.
Whatever its merits, Article III status is unlikely to arrive
for specialist judges in the near future. The Federal Circuit is
an appellate court of semi-specialized jurisdiction that differs
from the proposed specialized trial tribunals with more exclusive and targeted jurisdictional authority. As the bankruptcy
court experience suggests, however, acceptance of this political
reality does not doom specialized courts to inferiority.16 Similarly, the well-regarded performance of U.S. magistrate judges-Article I judges who serve eight-year terms-also suggests
that Article III appointment is not vital to attracting high
quality adjudication. Sufficient Article I security, stature and
support appear to be capable of overcoming the status differential at least to an acceptable degree.'6 6 The bankruptcy and
magistrate judge experiences suggest that future Article I
federal specialized judges should be given terms of office of at
least ten years and be entitled to a presumption of reappoint-

best served by an array of specialized courts of limited size rather than a larger
generalist bench.
16 See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 52.
1
See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 47.
1
But the perception of difference in status has not been overcome entirely.
Ask any lawyer which bench has more prestige and intellectual horsepower and he
or she will almost certainly choose the federal district court over the bankruptcy
court or magistrate judges, rightly or wrongly.
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ment unless Congress finds specific fault with them."s
C. Avoiding Interest Group Influences in Selection of Judges
Related to the status and job security issues is judicial
selection. Just as greater stature and support enhance the
chance for successful specialized courts, they also make it more
likely that judicial selection is performed with greater care. In

the American experience, the more high-prestige and high-profile judicial positions receive the greatest scrutiny. Although
that scrutiny frequently focuses to excess on the trivial"~ or
the bizarre,16 9 at least it is scrutiny.
Nominations for less visible federal judicial appointments
can range from seemingly pro forma consideration 7 ' to ex-

" It is important in decisions regarding reappointment that the specialist bar
and its clientele not have an exclusive voice in the evaluation of specialist judges.
If this occurs it would tend to confirm the fears to the specialization critic3 who
argue that specialized tribunals are more vulnerable to interest group pressure.
Listening too closely to those appearing before the specialist court would suggest
that specialist judges who displease litigants are vulnerable when the judges' decisions favor the public interest over those of the interest group.
Although an extensive consideration of state court judicial stature and security obviously lies beyond the scope of this Article, state specialized courts should
attempt to parallel the state generalist courts in terms of job security. Because
even most state generalist courts lack the expansive protections accorded the Article III federal judiciary, however, there is less political resistance to giving specialist courts equivalent treatment, since comparable state generalist courts tend to
enjoy a less lofty perch than the Article III federal bench. As we are reminded in
this Symposium, however, the experience of Family, Housing, Estate Administration and other courts in many state systems suggests that much more than essentially equivalent status is required to ensure that specialized courts are of a quality comparable to generalist courts. See Gibbons, supra note 39, at 47, 50.
" See Richard L. Berke, Question Arises on Top Pick for Court, SAN DIEGO
UNION & TRIB., June 13, 1993, at Al (asking whether Justice Breyer should have
paid social security taxes for an elderly, part-time housekeeper who, as his counsel
Kenneth Feinberg perhaps inartfully put it, "putters around and bakes cookies").
" See Richard Berke, Thomas Backers Attack Hill, Judge, Vowing He Won't
Quits, Says He Is Victim of Race Stigma, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at Al (attempting to establish that Justice Thomas did not sexually harass Professor Anita
Hill, Sen. Orrin Hatch engages in extensive colloquy over whether Prof Hill had
read the William Peter Blatty novel The Exorcist, which has a reference to pubic
hair on a can of cola); Ruth Marcus, Thomas Allies Step Up Counterattack,, WASH.
POST, Oct. 31, 1991, at Al; Thomas: 'This Plays Into the Maost Bigoted, Racist
Stereotypes," WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1991, A23;.
170 This can occur even at the Supreme Court level For example, Justice Scalia
received relatively little examination at his confirmation hearings, a result probably flowing from the Senate's exhaustion from the divisive battle over Justice
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tensive battles. Usually, the battles over non-Supreme Court
nominees occur where ideology or interest group pressure focuses on a particular candidate. For example, the Clinton Administration nominations of H. Lee Sarokin to the Third Circuit and Rosemary Barkett to the Eleventh Circuit became
controversial when certain political forces objected to their
respective liberality and reservation about the death penalty. 171

It appears that Article III nominees of higher stature (e.g.,
U.S. Supreme Court or U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals) receive
greater public scrutiny than do bankruptcy or magistrate judges. Specialization at the trial level rather than at the appellate
level may institutionalize lower public scrutiny of the nominations. Some removal from the public and political arena may
result in less partisan or emotional scrutiny of judicial appointments or (in state systems) judicial elections. To a large degree, however, close scrutiny of judicial selection-or at least
the realistic possibility of close scrutiny-tends to produce a
better bench despite the occasional political sideshow.
The extent to which specialized tribunals have high stature and more complete power over the subject matter of their
specialization will naturally tend to increase the control over
selection exercised by the political community. However, because specialized courts normally have less power and stature-especially those at the trial level-the selection process of

Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice. Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R.
Hearsley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan
and Bush, 57 AL. L. REV. 1111, 1118-19 (1994); Christopher E. Smith, Justice
Antonin Scalia and the Institution of American Gouernment, 25 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 783, 786-87 (1990).
"" See Marcus, supra note 86. Although confirmation battles that make the
newspaper are rare, this hardly means that Article III appointees are not subject
to scrutiny. During the Clinton Administration, for example, it appears that impor-

tant senators are consulted and their views frequently prompt the Administration
to refrain from certain nominations. See, e.g., Eva M. Rodriguez, Blowin in the
Wind, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1995, at 6; Neil A. Lewis, New Chief of Judiciary
Panel May Find an Early Test with Clinton, N.Y. TmIES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A31
(suggesting that Sen. Hatch's opposition to Georgetown Law Professor Peter

Edelman, a former Robert Kennedy aide and husband of Children's Defense Fund
founder Marian Wright Edelman, prompted Clinton to drop or consider dropping

the possibility of Edelman appointment to the bench, notwithstanding close personal ties between Clinton and Edelman). In addition, all Article III nominees and
judicial appointments generally appear to be subject to background investigations
by the FBI and other inquiry by the Administration.
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specialist judges should be structured to ensure a good deal of
investigation, scrutiny and debate before selection. This process should include consultation with relevant expert and interest groups, particularly bar associations. Selections should
be well-publicized and should include a significant comment
period prior to the finalization of any selection. Once selected,
specialist judges should have job security comparable to that of
generalists.
D. The Subject Matter of Specialization Must Be Selected with
Care
To state a truism, not every aspect of the law is apt for
specialized adjudication. Prevailing commentary advocates
specialization in less value-laden topics for which it is possible
to achieve a professional consensus. In addition, the topic
should be one over which a generalist bench is unlikely to
achieve sufficient expertise and efficiency under its normal
caseload. The specialist bench functions better if it receives a
critical enough mass of cases to enable economies of scale in
the acquisition and application of knowledge and in the processing of cases. The specialized subject matter also must be
one that can be isolated from other legal issues with relative
ease.
Applying these criteria suggests that specialization is
virtually impossible for some legal areas, including constitutional law (both the issues of constitutional structure and individual rights) and torts.' Some possible areas for successful
1I2 One problematic but possible area of future specialization includes employment law. On one level, the topic is inapt for specialization because it can be so
value-laden and subject to political disagreement about the rights of workers versus employers and what constitutes actual or unacceptable discrimination. See Ann
C. McGinley, Reinuenting Reality: The Improper Use of After-Acquired Euidence in
Title VH Cases, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145 (1994) (noting tendency of several courts to
adopt indefensibly illogical or sophistic positions on admissibility and concluding
this evidences hostility to the Title VII cause of action, employee rights or the
individual plaintiff rather than sound legal analysis); Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions:Richard Posner and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 46 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (finding Posner's resolution of
pregnancy discrimination claim affected by his value structure in derogation of
correct application of law). But, on the other hand, trial court adjudication of job
claims (discrimination, accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA"), discharge violative of public policy, enforceability of arbitration agree-
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specialization include: bankruptcy; international trade and
tariffs; taxation; patents; (already accomplished or at least
commenced); social security and other government benefits;
employee benefits (ERISA) litigation; and regulatory matters
regarding natural resources, land management or insurance.
At this juncture, despite the substantial and important
scholarly literature on these issues, continued caution seems
vital. Each instance of proposed specialization should received
case-specific scrutiny that considers the historical context of
the topic as well as the current political forces impinging upon
the issue.
CONCLUSION

Dreyfuss's work suggests that specialization can be both
too purified and too diluted. For example, she suggests that
the Federal Circuit is advantaged because its judges are exposed to a range of legal questions in addition to patent law.
Simultaneously, however, she argues that one shortcoming of
the Federal Circuit specialization regime is that the court does
not have complete authority over all patent questions since
these issues may be litigated outside the Federal Circuit.
In describing the court's "semi-specialized" nature as beneficial, I am referring to courts that have jurisdiction over more
than one subject matter. Where possible, however, these semispecialized courts should have complete authority over the
specialized subject matters placed within their jurisdiction. A
specialized court that shares authority over a topic with other
courts is incompletely specialized (unless the incomplete auments, employment-at-will and its exceptions) might provide substantially swifter
and clearer adjudication in view of the significant complexities of this area of the
law. For example, many trial judges frequently seem to have a shaky grasp upon
the apt use of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting formula for processing Title
VII claims. See McGinley & Stempel, supra. Others have read the ADA in ways
that prompt jaw-dropping. See, e.g., Hindman v. GTE Data Servs., Inc., No. 931046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 WL 371396 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1994), where an employee
was dismissed from his job for possessing a firearm on the premises. The employee claimed that he was discriminated against because of his disability-a chemical
imbalance that he alleged caused him to bring the gun to work. The court found a
triable issue of fact. Some trial level expertise subject to generalist appellate review would improve and departisanize this area of the law without breaking its
connection to the political and social values that inspired much of the nation's
employment legislation.
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thority is intended as a means of providing cross-fertilization
or a check-and-balance on doctrinal development). Incomplete
specialization sometimes may be inevitable due to important or
immutable considerations-such as federalism, judicial independence or the adversary system.
The question remains whether incompletely specialized
courts are worse than a regime of generalist adjudication. I
continue to think that if the political-legal community is to
attempt greater specialization, it should do so through courts
that have completely specialized subject matter, regardless of
whether the specialist judges exercising that control have other
jurisdictional tasks (and are hence semi-specialized). Incomplete specialization is less preferable to comprehensively specialized courts and possibly even to continued generalized
adjudication as well.
Although the Delaware Chancery experience generally has
been viewed as successful, this may well be due to the special
confluence of historical factors Dreyfuss notes and the leavening influence of the Delaware Supreme Court. Although Delaware jurisprudence emerges as successful in the Dreyfuss
account, that assessment has yet to be chiseled into the history
books of American law. Even if her assessment is correct, it
remains unclear whether the same favorable outcome could
have resulted from a generalist system in Delaware. On the
whole, however, specialized corporate adjudication seems successful in Delaware, although it may not necessarily be a model for other states.
A specialized commercial court is even more problematic
for the reasons set forth by Dreyfass. The abundant contractual disputes in courts can be processed coherently by generalist
judges with adequate predictability, efficiency, speed and accuracy. Moving to a specialist regime for these sorts of suits thus
gains little of the posited advantages of specialized adjudication but runs non-trivial risks of interest group capture, tunnel
vision or jadedness in favor of or against certain litigants.
Although a specialized adjudicator may handle certain types of
complex commercial disputes better than a generalist judge,
these cases should have a unifying thread other than being
business-related in order to justify the establishment of specialized tribunals.
Until a better environment and articulated rationale
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emerges, Dreyfuss appears correct in counseling Pennsylvania
to refrain from establishing any specialized commercial court
of the type discussed in this Symposium. Other states similarly
would be wise to heed her counsel. But Dreyfuss's successful
criticism of the Pennsylvania initiative must not overshadow
the bulk of her work, which foresees successful specialized
adjudication of corporate governance and patent matters, as
well as the possibility of successful specialization in the future.
As a society with pressing dispute resolution needs, we
cannot attempt to mass produce the Chancery experience as a
panacea for change. Instead, lawyers, judges, politicians and
interest groups must figuratively roll up their collective sleeves
and work toward institutionalizing new subsystems of dispute
resolution to expedite economical case processing, while retaining the traditional American commitment to accurate and wise
decisionmaking.

